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Aalto University School of Economics     ABSTRACT 
Department of Management and International Business 
International Business 
Jyri Lintunen 
 
MOTIVES AND LOCATION FACTORS OF THE CHINESE OUTWARD FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN A SMALL DEVELOPED ECONOMY 
 
Objectives 
This study examines the motives and locational factors of the Chinese foreign direct 
investment in smaller developed economies. The target economies of the study are both 
Finland and Sweden in order to improve the generalizability of the results. In the 
academic literature, foreign direct investments have been studied extensively but the 
Chinese investment is a relatively new phenomenon which has not been studied much - 
especially in the small developed economies. In recent years, the Chinese have rapidly 
increased their foreign investments, so it is increasingly important to understand why the 
Chinese invest abroad and how the different factors affect their investment decisions 
about the destination countries. Purpose of this study is to provide additional information 
on these issues in the context of small developed economies. 
 
Research method 
The research method of the study is a qualitative multiple-case study which is supported 
by secondary sources. The secondary sources have been documents, archival materials 
and statistics, among others. For the study totally 38 Finnish, Chinese and Swedish 
persons were interviewed representing Chinese enterprises, chambers of commerce, 
investment promotion organizations, partner as well as other expert organizations. The 
interviews were conducted as semi-structured and open-ended theme interviews.  
 
Results 
According to the results, the Chinese invest in the studied small developed economies 
particularly because of market seeking and strategic asset seeking motives. Market 
seeking investments have been made mostly by the small family enterprises and high 
technology companies especially in ICT sector, while strategic asset seeking investments 
have been made by the advanced Chinese ICT and software corporations. Small 
developed economies do not possess location-specific advantages which are particularly 
attractive for the Chinese investments on a global scale. The cost level and taxation are 
high, natural resources scarce, markets small and the countries are distant from China 
both geographically and culturally. However, the clusters of the knowledge-intensive 
sectors attract the large and international Chinese companies. In addition, the Chinese 
investors are interested in the developed infrastructure as well as high level of education 
and research. Both the investment motives and location factors are mostly similar in the 
target economies of the study. The strengths of Sweden have been the active invest-in 
promotion, broader industrial base as well as long trade relations with China. 
 
Keywords: China, foreign direct investments, small developed countries, investment motives, 
locational factors  
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MOTIVES AND LOCATION FACTORS OF THE CHINESE OUTWARD FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN A SMALL DEVELOPED ECONOMY 
 
Tavoitteet 
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kiinalaisten suorien ulkomaaninvestointien motiiveja ja 
niiden sijoituspaikkavalintoihin vaikuttavia tekijöitä pienissä kehittyneissä talouksissa. 
Tutkimuksen kohdealueina ovat sekä Suomi että Ruotsi tulosten yleistettävyyden 
parantamiseksi. Suoria investointeja on akateemisessa kirjallisuudessa tutkittu laajasti, 
mutta kiinalaisinvestoinnit ovat verrattain uusi ilmiö eikä niihin johtavia syitä ole juuri 
tutkittu varsinkaan pienten kehittyneiden talouksien osalta. Viime vuosien aikana 
kiinalaiset ovat nopeasti lisänneet investointejaan ulkomailla, joten on yhä tärkeämpää 
ymmärtää miksi kiinalaiset investoivat ulkomaille ja miten eri tekijät vaikuttavat heidän 
päätöksiinsä investointien kohdemaista. Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on antaa 
lisätietoa edellä mainituista seikoista pienten kehittyneiden talouksien kontekstissa. 
 
Tutkimusmenetelmät 
Tutkimuksen empiirinen osa perustuu kvalitatiiviseen useamman tapauksen 
tapaustutkimusmenetelmään, jonka tukena on käytetty myös sekundaarilähteitä. 
Sekundaarilähteinä ovat olleet muun muassa asiakirjat, arkistomateriaalit ja tilastot. 
Tutkimusta varten haastateltiin yhteensä 38 suomalaista, kiinalaista ja ruotsalaista 
henkilöä kiinalaisyrityksistä, kauppakamareista, investointipromootio-organisaatioista, 
partneri- sekä muista asiantuntijaorganisaatioista. Haastattelut toteutettiin 
puolistrukturoituina teemahaastatteluina.  
 
Tulokset 
Tutkimustulosten perusteella kiinalaiset investoivat tutkimuksessa tarkasteltuihin pieniin 
kehittyneisiin talouksiin varsinkin markkinoiden sekä strategisten voimavarojen ja 
hyötyjen takia. Markkinahakuisia investointeja ovat tehneet varsinkin pienet 
perheyritykset sekä korkean teknologian yritykset erityisesti ICT sektorilla. Strategisia 
voimavaroja ovat näistä talouksista hakeneet varsinkin korkean teknologian ICT ja 
ohjelmistoalojen kiinalaisyritykset. Pienillä kehittyneillä talouksilla ei juuri ole sellaisia 
sijaintiin liittyviä etuja, jotka erityisesti houkuttelevat kiinalaisinvestointeja globaalissa 
mittakaavassa. Kustannustaso ja verot ovat korkeita, luonnonvarat vähäisiä, markkinat 
pieniä ja maat ovat sekä maantieteellisesti että kulttuurillisesti kiinalaisille kaukaisia. 
Tietointensiivisten alojen klusterit houkuttelevat kuitenkin näillä aloilla toimivia 
kansainvälisiä kiinalaisyhtiöitä. Tämän lisäksi kehittynyt infrastruktuuri sekä korkea 
koulutus- ja tutkimustyön taso kiinnostavat kiinalaisia investoijia. Sekä motiivit että 
sijaintitekijät ovat pääosin samoja tutkimuksen kohdemaissa. Ruotsin vahvuuksina ovat 
olleet aktiivinen investointipromootio, laajempi teollisuuskanta sekä kauppasuhteet 
Kiinan kanssa. 
Avainsanat: Kiina, suorat ulkomaaninvestoinnit, pienet kehittyneet taloudet, 
investointimotiivit, sijoituspaikkavalinnat 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Since the beginning of China‟s Open Door Policy in 1978, its economy has developed 
astonishing rapidly from a poor developing country and minor player of international 
trade to one of the greatest economic powers whose continuously strengthening influence 
appears globally, also in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to IMF 
statistics (2010), in 1982 the gross domestic product (GDP) of China was only USD 281 
billion in current prices (USD 277 per capita). Since then China‟s economy has grown 
annually between 3.8% and 15.2%, and in 2009 GDP was already USD 4909 billion 
(USD 3678 per capita). Bloomberg (2010) reported that its GDP had surpassed Japan and 
China became the second largest economy after the USA during the second quarter in 
2010 and in January 2011 Xinhua reported that GDP grew totally by 10.3% in 2010. If 
China‟s GDP is counted by purchasing power parity (PPP) it is already approaching the 
two largest economic centers of the world, EU and the USA. Furthermore, recent global 
economic crisis seemed to confirm the global position of China since its economy and 
investment activities abroad have suffered considerable less than the world average. 
Actually China nearly doubled its outward FDI in 2008, while global total FDI plunged 
by around 20% (Davies 2009). 
 
During last three decades, China's enormous economic growth has been based largely on 
its opening economic policies along with cheap production costs, supported by obviously 
artificially cheap currency level of Chinese yuan, which have attracted a huge amount of 
foreign investment to the country and made it “the factory of the world” (Kettunen et al. 
2008). This has boosted China's foreign trade and it increased 67-fold from 1980 to 2008 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2009). By its exports, China reached the number 
one position in the world during 2009 and in 2010 the value of China‟s exports reached 
the all-time record, USD 1578 billion and trade surplus was USD 183 billion (China 
Customs Statistics 2011). According to CIA World Factbook (2011), China has had the 
largest surplus of current account in the world during the recent years. China has a huge 
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trade surplus with the USA, Europe and Hong Kong but it has an explicit trade deficit 
with many countries in East Asia, e.g. Japan and Korea (China Customs Statistics 2011). 
China‟s trade surplus turned to rapid growth in the middle of the 2000s and as the 
consequence also China‟s foreign exchange reserves have swollen greatly as the central 
bank of China (People‟s Bank of China) buys the foreign currencies (mainly US dollars) 
earned by the Chinese exporting companies and exchanges them for Chinese yuan 
(Figure 1). Thus China‟s foreign exchange reserves are the biggest in the world at the 
moment. They were USD 2399 billion in December 2009 and even USD 2454 billion in 
June 2010. Furthermore, China has gained substantial income from inward foreign 
investments and taxes from foreign companies (BOFIT 2009; SAFE 2011). 
 
Figure 1. Foreign trade balance and foreign exchange reserves of China in 1990-
2009. 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010; China Custom Statistics 2010; 
SAFE 2011.  
 
Chinese government has utilized its quickly growing incomes and foreign exchange 
reserves in several ways. It has gradually improved the well being of citizens, invested 
enormously in infrastructure - as even 60 % of fixed investment has been made in 
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infrastructure-related projects (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010) -, imported 
raw materials for supporting of construction and economic growth, as well as established 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and investment companies for different purposes. The 
largest and most famous of those are China Investment Corporation (CIC), State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) Investment Company and CITIC Group. 
They have invested hundreds of billions of USD especially in foreign treasury bonds, e.g. 
U.S. Treasuries, and in large foreign companies. However, along with the recent bad 
performance of the US dollar and the Western companies, the Chinese government has 
shifted to back up substantially the internationalization and foreign investments of the 
Chinese enterprises.  
 
Together with the liberalized outward investment policies of China and growing 
competitiveness of the Chinese MNEs, the government‟s support has clearly reflected in 
the amount of outward FDI which has skyrocketed since 2003. The growth has been 
particularly strong since 2007, despite the fact that meanwhile the world economy 
suffered from the global financial crisis. In 2009, the stock of the Chinese outward FDI 
was already USD 229.6 billion (Figure 2), and the same year inward investment flow in 
China was the second largest (USD 95 billion) and outward flow from China the sixth 
largest in the world (USD 48 billion). These figures were the largest among the 
developing countries (UNCTAD 2010). The figures reported by the Chinese authorities 
were slightly different, inward FDI flow USD 90 billion and outward FDI flow USD 56.5 
billion (Invest in China 2010; MOFCOM 2010). Very recently, CIA (2011) estimates that 
the stock of the Chinese outward FDI was USD 278.9 billion while the stock of the 
inward FDI was USD 574 billion. 
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Figure 2. Development of stocks of inward and outward FDI of China in 1990-2009. 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2010. 
 
Europe has never enjoyed a special popularity among the Chinese investors, and by 2009 
only 3.5% of the Chinese FDI had been focused on Europe (MOFCOM 2010). However, 
the latest statistics reported that the flow of the Chinese FDI has increased the most into 
Europe (alongside North America) and it almost trebled in 2009 (Xinhuanet 2010). This 
indicates the potential of the Chinese FDI to become a significant force and boost also in 
the European economy. By far Germany, the UK and Russia have received the most of 
the Chinese FDI in Europe, although the most of the Chinese FDI has been invested in 
the Asian side of Russia. Actually, the biggest amount has gone into Luxembourg which 
was in a special favour with the Chinese investors in 2009 and rose up to even China's 
fourth largest investment destination. 
This is particularly due to the attractive tax regime for foreign holding and financing 
investments in Luxembourg (Deloitte 2010). In Northern Europe, Sweden has managed 
to attract the most of the Chinese investment, the tenth most in Europe in 2009 (in 2008 
Sweden was even the fifth), but proportions of other countries have been insignificant 
(MOFCOM 2010).  
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Small developed countries with open economy (for clarity henceforth called ‟small 
developed countries‟) are very heterogeneous as a group and amount of the Chinese FDI 
vary between the countries. Geographically huge and natural resource-rich Canada and 
Australia have received a considerable amount of the Chinese investments, as well as 
ethnically almost completely Chinese city state Singapore. In addition, China has 
invested moderately in some relatively small but traditional foreign trading countries, 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden. However, the majority of small developed countries 
such as Finland, Austria, Israel, Switzerland and Norway, have received only a handful of 
investments from China, although e.g. Switzerland is generally an important host country 
for FDI, and Norway has extensive oil and gas reserves (MOFCOM 2010). In line with 
the general trend of the Chinese FDI, their majority has been made into the small 
developed countries only in very recent years. Nevertheless, when the flow of the 
Chinese FDI is once opened, the trend in most countries has explicitly been growing, and 
there is no sign why this will not happen either in Finland or other similar countries. 
 
Recently, Finland has also increased the support for the Chinese investments the both at 
the political level and public promotion of Finland as an attractive FDI destination. It is 
interesting to observe how these efforts will begin to bear fruit, and that is why it is 
important to find out what have been the motives behind the already existing Chinese 
investments in Finland, why they have ended up to choose Finland as their FDI location, 
and how they have experienced the Finnish business and investment environment. 
Moreover, for extending the outlook of the topic, it is also fruitful to chart the opinions of 
the local experts and to benchmark why there are so much more Chinese investments in 
Sweden than in Finland, despite the proximity and similarity of the countries.  
 
1.2 Previous research and research gap 
 
While there are extensive general studies of Western MNE‟s foreign direct investments 
as well as a growing number of studies concerning FDI into emerging economies, the 
academic discussion about FDI from emerging economies, such as China, has begun only 
relatively recently. Particularly little is known about the Chinese investments as well as 
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their motives and factors behind the FDI location choices in small developed economies, 
such as Finland, which are not rich by the natural resources, and are geographically as 
well as culturally distinct from China. In addition, relatively little researched information 
is available about how the Chinese face these host countries as an investment and 
business environment. 
 
Nowadays, along with the growth of the Chinese outward investments also a growing 
number of studies and publications has been written by both the Chinese and foreign 
authorities introducing the general development and nature of Chinese FDI, for example 
the Chinese Yang (2003 & 2006) about the Chinese outward FDI as FDI from a 
developing country and the networks behind the Chinese FDI, Deng (2004) about 
motives and implications of the Chinese FDI and Li (2007) about the Chinese MNEs as 
latecomers in the field of FDI, as well as often quoted publications by Buckley et al. 
(2007 & 2008b) about trends of the Chinese FDI, Child & Rodrigues (2005) about the 
impact of the internationalization of the Chinese MNEs on the general FDI theories, 
Erdener & Shapiro (2005) about internationalization of the Chinese family businesses and 
Morck et al. (2008) about the common perspectives over the Chinese FDI.  
 
However, general literature on the Chinese investments in small developed countries is 
practically absent, but studies focus on the Chinese FDI received by individual small 
developed countries. In Finland, only a couple of studies, articles and other overviews 
have been published about Chinese investments, e.g. Kaartemo‟s (2007) and 
Barauskaite‟s (2009) publications from Pan-European Institute (Turku School of 
Economics) about the motives of the Chinese FDI and trade relationships, although their 
focuses have been much broader covering the entire Baltic Sea region including both 
large and small countries. Little more studies and scientific articles have been published 
concerning the question of the subject matter in Sweden. These include, among others, 
Abrahamsson & Nyvall (2007) about the barriers for the Chinese MNEs to entry in 
Sweden, Englund, Merker & Ölund (2007) about the case of Fanerdun in Kalmar, 
Schölin (2007) about Fanerdun‟s impact to local development in Kalmar, as well as 
Nakamura & Olsson (2008) about the motives and pattern of private Chinese FDI to 
Sweden. All these focused in single Chinese investments in Sweden. In addition, Fromlet 
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(2006) from Swedbank has published an analysis of the impacts of the Chinese 
globalization in the Baltic Sea region. 
 
Because of scarce research attention in the Chinese FDI in Finland, especially concerning 
the experiences of several Chinese investors particularly from the Finnish business 
environment, there is an evident research gap in this subject matter. Further research in 
this field is clearly beneficial for many stakeholders, such as the local and Chinese trade 
& investment promote authorities and organizations, the local and Chinese companies as 
well as scholars in the field of FDI research because the Chinese FDI is an emerging and 
rapid growing phenomenon in the global economy, and additional information from their 
performance in different geographic regions and business environment is necessary. 
 
1.3 Research problem and research questions 
 
Significance of large emerging economies and their MNEs have grown enormously 
within recent decades, especially in respect of China and Chinese MNEs. According to 
the traditional FDI theories foreign investment directed first to the neighbouring regions 
as well as to larger markets. This has been the case of China too, although commercial 
and political reasons have directed a growing number of the Chinese FDI also to more 
distant destinations, e.g. Africa, Latin America and Europe. The Chinese have mainly 
invested in geographically close countries, and in the countries of large markets or natural 
resources. This has been cleared up in many recent published studies about the Chinese 
FDI. However, it is still fairly unclear if the results of those studies apply also in smaller 
countries with developed economy and institutions. Furthermore, according to available 
data, the Chinese FDI have distributed rather unevenly between small and apparently 
similar countries such as Finland and Sweden. Thus, it is important to research if there 
are some distinctive motives and location factors that influence the investment decision 
of the Chinese MNEs particularly in small developed economies and therefore the 
research problem is the following:  
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What are the main motives for the Chinese FDI and the main factors that affect the 
Chinese FDI location decisions in small developed economies? 
 
Next, the two first research questions are formed for answering the research problem 
using Finland as the empirical subject of the study. The last question is formulated in 
order to find out if the results of the preceding questions are generalizable also to other 
small developed economies besides the subject country by comparing them with another 
small developed economy, Sweden. Furthermore, at a practical level, the last question 
seeks to provide answers to the fact why the number of Chinese FDI has been varying so 
much between two, externally very similar, small developed countries. 
 
1) What have been the main motives behind the Chinese FDI in Finland? 
2) What have been the most important location factors that affect the orientation of 
the Chinese FDI in Finland? 
3) Are there differences in the motives and locations factors behind Chinese FDI in 
Finland and Sweden? 
 
The first question addresses the reasons why the Chinese MNEs have generally chosen to 
invest abroad, in this case in a small developed economy Finland. In some extent, push-
factors of the Chinese MNEs to utilize FDI are discussed. The second question, in turn, is 
concerned with the reasons why Finland has been chosen (and also why not) the host 
country for the Chinese FDI, i.e. the pull-factors of Finland in the case of the Chinese 
FDI. Finally, due to the earlier mentioned scarcity of literature on the Chinese FDI in 
small developed economies, the results obtained from Finland can be only limitedly 
compared with the previous literature. Therefore, possibilities for comparison to similar 
countries and the generalizability of the results are improved by using Sweden as a 
benchmark. 
 
In the next chapter, the key concepts of this study are defined, and after that relevant 
literature to the research questions is reviewed.   
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1.4 Definitions of key concepts  
 
In this chapter the most important three key concepts of this study are defined in order to 
make clearance what they are and what they are not, as well as to provide some 
background information about each theme for the reader. Below the concepts are listed in 
order as they appear in the study, not in a priority order. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
According to traditional definition, a foreign direct investment (FDI) means a physical 
long-term investment from an enterprise‟s (direct investor) domestic economy into 
another economy. FDI can be a transfer of the capital, managerial or technical assets and 
it is distinguished from, for example, international trading so that the investor owns 
or/and controls a foreign affiliate and facilities. The capital components of FDI are equity 
capital, reinvested earnings and other capital, mainly intra-company loans (UNCTAD 
2002). In comparison, OECD (2008) determines direct investment enterprises (in host 
country) as corporations which either may be subsidiaries, where over 50% of the voting 
power is held, or associates, where between 10% and 50% of the voting power is held, or 
they may be quasi-corporations such as branches which are effectively 100% owned by 
their respective parents. Lower ownership shares and voting power are known as a 
portfolio investment. 
 
Multinational Enterprise 
 
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is an enterprise that manages value-adding activities, 
such as production and services, or controls assets outside of its own country/economy. 
Other terms having the same meaning are a multinational corporation (MNC) and 
transnational corporation (TNC), although in some contexts the TNCs have more 
localized foreign functions while the MNEs do not have coordinated product offerings in 
each country. According to Dunning & Lundan (2008, 3) MNE is the result of previous 
FDI. 
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Small Developed Economy 
 
Small developed economies (SDE) are often referred also to „small and open economies‟ 
(SMOPEC) (e.g. Bellak & Luostarinen 1994; Laanti et al. 2009) and obviously there is no 
clear difference between these terms in the field of international business. Both terms also 
contain approximately the same frequency in the literature. Gammelgaard et al. (2009) 
define a small economy by the size of its GDP ”which is a proxy for the quantity of 
labour, capital assets, and natural resources bases”, whereas they define level of 
development by GDP per capita which is “estimate of social infrastructure such as life 
expectancy, percentage of urban population, and education levels”. Hence, small 
developed country possesses relatively small GDP but high GDP per capita.  
 
Another definition (Dixit 2005, 248) of small developed economy / small open economy 
is that it participates in international trade, but because its smallness its policies do not 
affect world prices, interest rates or incomes. Thus these kinds of countries are so 
called ‟price takers‟. According to Laanti et al. (2009), SDE (or SMOPEC) are small 
countries that have opened their borders for international trade in competition with no or 
limited barriers. Usually, countries of this kind have higher export/GDP ratios than larger 
countries and FDI inflows have a bigger impact in smaller countries (Bellak & 
Luostarinen 1994, 3). However, the larger size of economy usually provides host location 
advantages (i.e. pull-factors) that determine the inflow of FDI, such as economies of size 
and scope in production as well as sales and distribution activities (Gammelgaard et al. 
2009). Laanti et al. (2009) count Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland to belong the 
group of small developed economies. A broader definition can also include some other 
countries, such as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Greece. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
First in this chapter, the most recognised theories reasoning of FDI are briefly introduced 
for better understanding about the phenomenon. After that motives for FDI and the 
factors that determine FDI host country locations are discussed as they are the main 
subjects of the research questions of this study. Next, the literature of the Chinese FDI 
activities is reviewed in order to perceive their distinct features compared with the FDI in 
general, including definition of the advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese MNE in 
their FDI activities and internationalization process. Lastly, motives and location factors 
are discussed concerning the Chinese FDI. 
 
2.1 Theories and determinants of foreign direct investments 
 
Research history of foreign business operations and phenomenon of foreign direct 
investment is relatively short. In practice, the main theories for them have been generated 
only after the Second World War and particularly during latest four decades. One of the 
earliest explications for foreign business operations and trade, also partly explaining the 
possible reasons for foreign manufacturing, was the Ricardian framework of comparative 
advantages (Ruffin 2002) which was published already in the early 19
th
 century, when 
international investments were still mainly an extension of colonial policy and made by 
chartered companies. In this framework the comparative advantage means that a certain 
country ought to specialize in production and export goods which it has production 
advantages over other countries and it also receives foreign investments in those sectors.  
 
Later the neoclassical theories, such as Heckscher-Ohlin framework (Heckscher & Ohlin 
1991) in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, were mainly focused on international 
arbitrages. According to them, the capital tends to flow into such countries where the rate 
of return for investment is the largest. Nonetheless, although these early theoretical 
frameworks gave certain capable explanations for both general and the present-day 
Chinese FDI activities, they were still at very general level. They did not provide answers 
to the questions about micro- and company-level reasons for making foreign investments 
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instead of international trade, i.e. questions about foreign ownership and organizing. 
(Dunning & Lundan 2008, 79; Dreyhaupt 2006, 22; Moosa 2002, 24). 
 
The breakthrough idea of imperfect markets and firm-specific advantages was firstly 
introduced by Stephen Hymer (1960 & 1976). He argued that company has to possess 
some monopolistic firm-specific advantages which are transferable to other countries, e.g. 
the economy of scale, product differentiation, technology and finance or intangible assets 
such as marketing, innovatory and managerial skills or famous trademarks and brands. 
With those advantages it is able to overcome the liability of foreignness, i.e. it is able to 
compete in foreign markets with indigenous companies which have benefits from their 
knowledge of local business environment and networks (Caves 1996, 3-5; Wilska 2002, 
21; McCann & Mudambi 2004; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 84). Because there is not a 
perfect market, it is not possible to freely obtain these advantages by other firms without 
acceptance of the owner company. Thus the owner company possesses monopolistic 
asset-power advantages and is able to seek rents from them. In order to fully benefit from 
these advantages abroad, the company has to have a control and ownership over its 
foreign operations and thus it ends up carrying out a foreign investment instead of 
exporting or licensing (Caves 1996, 27). As discussed in the latter chapters, the Chinese 
companies have only a few, if increasing, amount of firm-specific advantages. However, 
certain special features behind the Chinese MNEs, mostly home country specific, provide 
them advantages that are compatible with the concepts put forward by Hymer.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s the global investment activity grew rapidly although even a larger 
leap occurred later at the beginning of the 2000s. Total flow of the global FDI increased 
15-fold from 1970 to 1990 and the annual growth rate of international FDI was 
approximately 15% (Table 1). This development correlated also with the amount of new 
FDI theories during those decades. Hymer‟s ideas were supplemented with theories 
which combined market imperfections, transaction costs and internalization as FDI 
determinants (e.g. Buckley & Casson 1976; Dunning 1980; Rugman 1981). According to 
the theories, companies are able to circulate and avoid market imperfections, e.g. tariff 
barriers, by the internalization of their foreign operations. Furthermore, market 
imperfections can also be consisted of transaction costs. This means that a company 
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either buys information of market and business environment and outsources the means of 
production/sales/marketing/R&D etc. in order to participate in a market (external 
transaction costs) or it gathers knowledge by itself and internalizes the means within the 
company, which is not free either (internal transaction costs). Williamson (1975) 
discussed this as the „market versus hierarchy‟ dilemma and Grosse (1985) calls it as the 
„make-or-buy‟ decision. If a company has firm-specific advantages which need a tight 
control over them to maximize the profit and avoid risk dissipation (copying etc.) or 
buying of means is too expensive, impossible or uncertain, it internalizes the foreign 
operation. In other words, it applies FDI. Conversely it finds exporting and licensing a 
cheaper way to utilize the foreign market (Rugman et al. 1986). Thus a company 
internalizes foreign activities since the costs of further internalization is higher than its 
benefits. Hoever, in practice it is difficult to obtain relevant data of costs and analyze it 
thoroughly (Rugman 1986; Wilska 2002, 23; Dreyhaupt 2006, 34).  
 
Table 1. Volume and annual growth rate of global FDI in 1970-2005. 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2010. 
 
Dunning (1980) continued to develop the internalization theory by affiliating it to his 
eclectic paradigm (often referred also as OLI paradigm), which is a more general theory 
of the framework of MNE and FDI phenomena than a bare explanation of it with the 
internalization and transaction costs. In the eclectic paradigm Dunning combined asset 
ownership advantages (O-advantages), location endowments (L-advantages) and 
internalization advantages (I-advantages) on the basis of previous FDI theories. O-
advantages refer to earlier discussed firm-specific advantages introduced by Hymer that 
enable a company to success abroad. L-advantages (FDI host country endowments) 
indicate those advantages or assets that are available to any company but exploitable only 
in certain locations, and include e.g. input cost advantages as cheap labour and affordable 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
1970-
1980
1980-
1990
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
FDI inflow 13 54 207 1 398 959 15,0 14,4 10,5 32,6 -7,3
FDI outflow 14 52 239 1 232 881 13,8 16,6 8,6 27,8 -6,5
FDI inw ard stock n/a 704 1 941 5 787 10 180 n/a 10,7 8,5 14,7 12,0
FDI outw ard stock n/a 549 1 785 6 148 10 598 n/a 12,5 10,5 15,9 11,5
Annual grow th rate (%)Value at current prices (billions of USD)
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natural resources, productive and skilled labour, large and/or growing markets, low 
taxation, good infrastructure as well as favourable political, legal, cultural, social and 
institutional environment. It should be also noted that locational advantages apply to both 
in home and host countries; at home they enhance the firm‟s ability to develop 
ownership-advantages and in host country they help the company to combine its 
ownership assets with local factors to gain higher benefits (Dreyhaupt 2006, 39). This is 
an essential consideration from the viewpoint of this study, i.e. what indigenous 
advantages the Chinese MNEs are able to exploit in small developed countries. Finally, 
by I-advantages Dunning means a company‟s ability to acquire and upgrade resources 
(McCann & Mudambi 2004), and internalize O- and L-advantages under organization‟s 
hierarchical control which reasons and benefits were defined earlier.  
 
Nevertheless, recently OLI-paradigm has been questioned and challenged because it 
expounds weakly why the so called latecomer countries, such as China, and their 
companies have managed to internationalize and make substantial foreign investments 
despite their deprivation of O-advantages, especially „dragon MNEs‟ from East Asia in 
the 1990s and 2000s (Mathews 2006; Li 2007). Therefore, so called LLL-framework 
(linkage, leverage and learning) has been proposed for a supplementary theory to describe 
the FDI phenomenon of the latecomer MNEs (Mathews 2006). However, Dunning (2006) 
has defended OLI-paradigm by access or/and augment based investments from 
developing countries (introduced further in the next paragraph) and different kind of 
competitive advantages of „dragon MNEs‟ – either firm- or country-specific ones. 
 
The last-mentioned advantages were earlier introduced e.g. by Rugman (Rugman et al 
1985, 119; Rugman 1986) who has argued that OLI-paradigm can still be further 
condensed by combining O- and I-advantages under a term of firm-specific advantages 
(FSA) since he argues that “ownership-advantage (where there is a risk of dissipation) 
has to be internalized in order to be effective (to prevent dissipation)” (Rugman 1986). 
Furthermore, he called Dunning‟s L-advantage as country-specific advantage (CSA) with 
the same content, but CSA finally determines how a company is able to utilize its FSA in 
certain location, i.e. which foreign operation mode it chooses. As mentioned earlier, CSA 
could be benefited both domestically and in certain host countries. At home, CSA provide 
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companies extra strength to internationalize and success in the global competition, 
whereas CSA in a certain host country gives possibilities to either exploit MNE‟s own 
FSA or acquire new FSA. The domestic CSA behind the Chinese MNEs are undoubtedly 
strong and help them to internationalize quickly, which has been elaborated more in 
Chapter 2.4. One purpose of this study is to find out what the host CSA in small 
developed countries (here Finland and Sweden) possess which attract the Chinese 
investment. Aspects of location and matters affecting the choice of FDI locations are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
2.2 Motives for FDI 
 
It is generally assumed that the ultimate motive for companies‟ international expansion is 
the pursuit of growth (Caves 1996, 57). Because of this, a firm that possesses firm-
specific assets and advantages enters a foreign market when it grows out the domestic 
market or there is an opportunity for more rapid growth abroad. It might also need to 
acquire means for further growth abroad, as in many cases in present China. At this stage, 
a firm usually formulates an international strategy which can lead to FDI but alternatively 
also to other foreign operation modes as explained earlier. Furthermore, also the motives 
of the firm affect the decision process of a foreign operation mode (Franco et al 2010).  
 
2.2.1 Dunning’s taxonomy of FDI motives 
 
From this basis, many studies have been concerned with FDI motives but there are still 
few systematic theoretical categorizations between different types of motives. The most 
famous and quoted categorization of FDI motives is Dunning‟s taxonomy (1993) which 
is closely related to him earlier developed the eclectic (OLI) paradigm. In the taxonomy, 
he divided the FDI motives into four main types – resource seeking, market seeking, 
efficiency seeking and strategic asset seeking (sometimes also called knowledge seeking) 
motives. Three former are so called asset exploiting FDI motives since by them the MNE 
exploits some of its existing firm specific assets, and are thus in line with O-advantages 
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of original Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm. Unlike the above-mentioned types, the last FDI 
motive type, strategic asset seeking, is based on the acquisition of new assets that MNE 
has been lacking. Nevertheless, an asset seeking FDI requires resources and the investing 
company must be large enough, well financed or it has to enjoy certain domestic country-
specific advantages, as the cheap financing in the case of the Chinese MNEs, for instance.  
 
However, few investments drop only into a single motive type (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 
68). Initially, most companies‟ motives are usually in the categories of resource or market 
seeking, but when their degree of international operations increases, they begin also to 
enhance the global market position by efficiency and strategic asset seeking investments. 
Dunning and Lundan have also elaborated that FDI can be aggressive, i.e. a proactive 
operation for advancing the strategic objectives, or defensive, i.e. a reaction to the 
competitor‟s move or act of foreign government, which calls for defense of prevailing 
market position. The Chinese FDI are usually proactive since the Chinese economy is so 
called latecomer economy and growth of the economy and the MNEs is fast.  
 
Resource seeking motives are much based on traditional location advantages and it 
contains three main types (Dunning, 1993; Dunning, 2002, 409; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 
68-69). The first type is a physical natural resource seeking - raw materials and energy 
sources that are inadequate in home country and are usually sought by the primary 
producers or manufacturing companies in order to minimize the costs and secure 
supply/import of resources. The second type is seeking well-motivated but cheap cost-
efficient labour with possible poor or mediocre working skills. These investments are 
usually made from high labour cost countries to cheaper ones within labour-intensive 
industries. Nevertheless, the importance of this type of investments is gradually 
diminishing as the role of cheap labour is decreasing in value-adding activities of global 
companies. The third type is seeking technology capability and managerial, marketing or 
organizational skills and expertise, which are mostly available in developed countries, 
also smaller of them, but rather scarce in developing and emerging economies which 
drives their MNEs to invest into countries of the former kind. According to Gammelgaard 
et al. (2009), the demand for skilled labour is globally increasing which also increases the 
potential of high value-adding seeking FDI to small developed countries. However, two 
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latter types could as well be classified also in other groups of motives. In addition, Franco 
et al (2010) have elaborated alternative solutions and locational determinants for the 
resource seeking FDI. As alternative solutions to the resource seeking FDI they propose 
the use of international trading intermediates and outsourcing, especially when 
transactions costs are moderate and supply assured. However, if the exchange rate of the 
host country is particularly volatile, FDI is usually used for protecting the MNE from the 
exchange rate risk of importing. This has been the case e.g. in natural resource FDI in 
Africa. Finally, the locations of a resource seeking FDI depend on the real costs and 
absolute scarcity of the resource as well as the productivity of the labour (Franco et al 
2010) which is obviously higher in developed than in developing countries.  
 
Market seeking investments have been probably the most common type of FDI (Larimo 
1993, 57; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 71). Also, according to the results of several FDI 
motive surveys in OECD countries from the 1960s to the 1990s, market-related motives 
had been more common reason for FDI than cost-related ones (Larimo 1993, 57-66). 
Market seeking investments are mainly based on strategic locational advantages and 
enhancing company‟s international, regional and local market power. They are often done 
in countries and markets where the investing company had earlier had e.g. exporting 
operations, but because of high import tariffs or large and/or fast growing market size has 
compelled or drawn it to involve in more permanent presence e.g. by a production or 
sales office investment. Market seeking investments could be also done to replace 
licensing or franchising if there is an increasing need for the higher control of the sales 
chains e.g. because of IPR or contractual problems. Franco et al. (2010) interpolate that if 
the products or technology can easily be imitated but it cannot be patented a company 
should utilize FDI, but if patenting works exporting and licensing are also relevant 
options. Market seeking types of investments are made to exploit new markets or protect 
existing markets, or, as Franco et al (2010) add, serve as an export-platform. This means 
that an investment in a certain country (with other locational than market advantages) is a 
platform from which products or services are exported primarily to surrounding countries, 
e.g. to other EU or NAFTA countries. Nevertheless, there is no unequivocal evidence that 
membership of the EU had directly increased the inward FDI flow to the smaller 
European countries (Gammelgaard et al. 2009). Besides above-mentioned market size or 
24 
 
growth as a market-oriented investment motive, the motive can also be a thrust to follow 
up company‟s main suppliers or customers to new locations and thus retain its business 
position, follow-up company‟s main competitors to their main market areas, adapting 
local culture, language and taste issues, the high cost of supply from probable distant 
home or other existing business locations, and so on (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 69-71). 
 
The third type of FDI motive, efficiency seeking, contains two main reasons why MNEs 
end up to utilize them: “taking advantage of differences in the availability and relative 
cost of traditional factor endowments in different countries” and “taking advantage of the 
economies of scale and scope, and of differences in consumer tastes and supply 
capabilities” (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 72). The investments of this kind are done to 
arrange and rationalize existing the resource- or/and market-based investments in order to 
gain from common governance policy and hence often also benefits from the economies 
of scale and scope as well as risk diversification. Other possible motives are to gain, for 
example, from production factors/endowments, different cultures, institutional 
arrangements, economic policies and structures by adding them into company‟s 
governance policy, i.e. benefits from different locations. Usually, these kinds of 
efficiency seekers are relatively large MNEs with standardized and geographically wide 
processes and other operations (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 72; Larimo 1993, 59). Franco 
et al (2010) note that the motive of efficiency seeking is very similar to the resource 
seeking because it is often based on gaining from the fragmented production and cheap 
labor cost in developing markets, and thus would not count it an independent motive. 
 
The goal of the last FDI motive type of Dunning‟s taxonomy, the strategic asset seeking, 
is to sustain or advance the company‟s global competitiveness by acquiring assets to 
supplement or increase the company's already existing assets. This is often performed by 
merging or acquiring assets of (or by cooperation modes e.g. a joint venture with) foreign 
corporations as a competitive strength in a new market (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 72), or 
by setting up a greenfield subsidiary e.g. near to R&D or supply cluster in order to gain 
the knowledge spillovers of agglomeration economies (Franco et al 2010). They add that 
if asset is not embedded in certain key personnel M&A is a more effective way to gain 
maximum benefit than capturing only the key personnel. The main target of strategic 
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asset seeking is to increase company‟s global portfolio with physical assets as technology, 
human skills (e.g. technological, managerial or organizational), but also intangible assets 
as brands, and thus to enhance its ownership-specific advantages, or weaken competitors‟ 
position. As the number of a strategic asset seeking type of FDI has increased rapidly, 
particularly in knowledge and information-intensive sectors, it has also increased the 
proportion of M&A as a modality of FDI (Dunning 1998). Due to their nature, most of 
the strategic asset seeking investments are focused on developed countries (Dunning 
1998), but recently also the MNE of emerging economies are increasingly involved in the 
strategic asset seeking investments because of their apparent lack of O-advantages, e.g. 
the purchase of IBM‟s PC division by Chinese company Lenovo in 2005 as an example. 
(Dunning & Lundan 2008, 72-74) 
 
In Table 2 types and motives of FDIs with some defining factors are introduced based to 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and above mentioned motives for FDI.  
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Table 2. Types and motives of FDIs with some defining factors based on the eclectic 
paradigm. 
Ownership advantages Location advantages Internalization advantages
Resource seeking Capital, technology, access 
to markets
Possession of natural 
resources, transport and 
communication, goverment 
policy (tax & FDI 
incentives)
Control of markets, stability 
of supplies
Market seeking Capital, technology, 
information, management 
skills, economies of scale, 
branding skills, R&D
Material & labour costs, 
market size and 
characteristics, government 
policy (regulations, FDI 
policy/incentives, 
tolls/import quotas)
Reduction of transaction & 
information costs, closer 
control over IPR issues 
Efficiency seeking As above, and access to 
markets, economies of 
scope, geographical 
diversification or clustering, 
international sourcing
Economies of 
product/process 
specialisation or 
concentration, labour costs, 
incentives for local 
production, favourable 
business environment
As above, and gains from 
economies of common 
governance
Strategic asset seeking Any of above if creating 
synergy with existing assets
Any of above that offer 
needed technology, 
organizational etc. assets
Economies of common 
governance, enhanced 
competetive/strategic 
advantages, risk reduction 
or diversification
Types of 
advantages
Motives
for FDI
 
Source: Modified from Dunning & Lundan (2008, 104-105) 
 
2.2.2 Other types of FDI motives 
 
Some authors also include political safety seeking investments in the list above (e.g. 
Korhonen 2005, 44). The reason for these investments is to reduce a risk of governmental 
interventions by undertaking investments in politically more stable countries and making 
divestments from more turbulent countries and economic circumstances, e.g. in cases of 
an unstable government regime or even war and civil strife. The recent examples of 
political safety seeking investments in the small developed economies are e.g. Hewlett-
Packard‟s data centre investment in Vantaa and Google‟s server centre investment in 
Hamina, Finland, in 2008 and 2009. One of the main motives for these investments was 
safety and political stable conditions in Finland which they consider as one of the most 
secure locations for FDI at issue (Kauppapolitiikka 2009). Also in Sweden similar 
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reasoning has been used in order to attract suchlike data center FDI (Invest in Sweden 
Agency 2010). Political regulations can also be a reason for investments which Dunning 
and Lundan (2008, 74) call escape investments. They are made in order to escape 
restrictive legislation and macro-economical policies, or to gain from FDI incentive 
policy. One examples of this are the “circulated” or “round-trip” investments between 
Hong Kong and mainland China to exploit tax privileges and other incentives that are 
granted only to foreign investors.   
 
Supplementary type of investment motive that Dunning mentions (Dunning 1993, 61; 
Dunning & Lundan 2008, 74-75) is the support investments, designed for helping and 
promoting the other MNE‟s activities in the host country or region. These subsidiaries are 
seldom profit makers themselves but their main contribution is to benefit other MNE‟s 
activities. Usually, they are sales and financial units that support and promote exporting 
of goods or services, after-sales maintenance and service units for clients, or purchasing 
unit to support MNE‟s sourcing in a foreign destination. 
 
However, unlike explained at the beginning of this chapter, FDI are not always made for 
gaining growth and a high rate of return but a MNE has also to consider risks. Hence 
internationalizing by FDI can act as a risk reducer following Markowitz‟s classic theory 
of portfolio diversification (1959). Also e.g. Rugman (1976) presents that MNE is able to 
reduce its overall risk by the international diversification of the investment portfolio – not 
necessarily meaning portfolio investments but a wide variation of host countries and/or 
industries of its FDI. Furthermore, in case of a developing economy, such as China, a 
significant part of the new capital is likely to flow abroad since there are strong incentives 
to diversify domestic risks in areas of, for example, politics and IPR (Xiao 2004). It is 
obvious that the small developed economies offer a good location for reducing a risk of 
those issues. 
 
Finally, although theoretically they are not concerned as FDI because of short-term 
perspective of their nature, also speculative foreign investments in real estate (land and 
property) are included in FDI data on national account calculations so they are worthy of 
mention in this context. The motive is mainly financial such as speculation about the 
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future expectation of real estate values, but sometimes also simply the ownership of 
foreign holiday apartments or second homes (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 76; Franco et al 
2010). For example, in China sterner investment legislation was as a result from the loss 
of control over the state asset and leakage of foreign exchange especially to real estate 
and stock market speculation in Hong Kong in the late 1990s (Buckley et al 2007). 
 
2.3 Determinants of FDI location 
 
One of the earliest location theories to analyze the geographical patterns of foreign 
operations is Weber‟s least cost location theory which was initially published already in 
1909 (translated into English in 1929). The theory, which applies predominantly at the 
country and industry level, suggests that the optimal location for industry is where the 
costs (general costs of transportation and labour as well local costs of market servicing, 
which usually are the lowest in agglomerations) can be minimized and thus the profits 
maximized. Hanink (1994, 203-204 & 217) noted, yet, that the least cost location theory 
applies the best to explain FDI from the so-called core markets (The USA, Europe and 
Japan) to the periphery and particularly in perfectly competitive product markets. 
However, international economy is rarely perfect since the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
characters of it, as well as governmental interventions are often involved thus making the 
markets imperfect. In practice, the least cost location theory has applied best to the 
industries producing bulk goods and exploiting cheap labor in developing countries, such 
as garment industry. One good example of this is the vast flow of FDI from the developed 
economies into emerging China in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
In the post-WWII era, a commonly used explanation model of location decision of MNE 
was Vernon‟s product-cycle model (1966). He argued that at country level innovations 
and sophisticated technology save labour costs, and thus the user value of those is the 
highest in the countries with high labour expenditures. That is why innovations are 
concentrated in high-income countries with a good supply of scientific and engineering 
resources. When innovated products and processes develop and large-scale production 
becomes feasible and cheaper, the domestic competition becomes more intense since 
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imitators appear in the market. In order to exploit home country advantages abroad this 
urges on to either export the products or/and transfer the production and technology to 
other countries, usually first to other developed countries and then to developing 
countries where production expenses are lower. However, similarly to the least cost 
location theory, the product-cycle theory has been generally based on center-periphery 
reasoning, and has not explained resource-based, efficiency-seeking or strategic-asset-
acquiring FDI. (Dunning & Lundan 2008, 85-86; Yang 2006, 35-36; McCann & 
Mudambi 2004). At first glance Vernon's theory cannot be reconciled with FDI made by 
the Chinese but along with the rapid accumulation of their innovations the Chinese MNEs 
have had increased opportunities to seek profits also in developed markets. This has 
reflected in the increased Chinese investment in the USA and Europe during very recent 
years that have also impugned the traditional division of center-periphery in the world 
economy. 
 
Contrary to the product life cycle theory, the Uppsala model has discussed more at the 
company level about MNE evolutionary and their internationalization processes, i.e. “the 
internationalization theory” or “stage theory” (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; 
Johanson & Vahlne 1977). According to the theory, the internationalization process of a 
company develops through the gradual acquisition of knowledge about the foreign 
markets and business operations. By increasing its size, knowledge and experience, the 
company is able and more willing to have stronger resource commitment - usually from 
export and licensing to FDI - in the foreign markets and geographically further areas (also 
Welch et al. 2007, 344-345). The theory predicts that at the first phase of its 
internationalization the company prefers physically, as well as culturally, the closest 
countries because of growing transaction costs from close to distant countries. With 
business operation experiences gathered from the physically close countries, the company 
is able to develop organizational routines for reducing the costs of collecting further 
information about the markets where its facilities are already located or the markets that it 
is going to penetrate in the future. Thus it can reduce uncertainty in their foreign 
investments and thereby enhance its ability to invest in distant locations. 
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2.3.1  Location factors 
 
When it comes to the attractiveness of particular locations, Dunning and Lundan (2008, 
324) summarized that literature in the 1970s and 1980s emphasized three main points: 1) 
costs and quality of given factor endowments, 2) size, nature and growth of local markets, 
and 3) policies of host government which have an affect on both factor endowments and 
markets. For example, Hood and Young (1979, 58-59) discussed about four main 
categories of locational factors: 1) labor costs including immigration costs as well as 
language and cultural barriers, 2) marketing factors (above mentioned added by the local 
competition and development level of market), 3) barriers to trade (quotas, tariffs and 
product standards), and 4) government policies including investment and general business 
climate as well as regulatory framework. Rugman et al. (1986, 101-102) explained the 
location specific factors with the previously introduced term country-specific advantages 
(CSA) which consist of three environmental variables: economic, non-economic and 
governmental. In the simplest model economic variables contain only labour and capital, 
but it could also be added by technology, natural resources and management skills or 
human capital. Non-economic variables refer to a wide set of the political-cultural 
dimensions of each nation that impose conditions, risks and opportunities that foreign 
companies have to perceive when operating in the country. Finally, both home and host 
governmental variables affect the MNE. In every country governmental interventions 
have their impacts in MNE‟s business and the environment at several levels, such as 
investment, trade and employment regulations. 
 
Currently, along with the globalization development and increased number of free-trade 
areas, such as EU and NAFTA, more attention has been paid to country-specific 
incentives and their enforcement affecting inward FDI. Caves (1996, 55-56) found out 
that in most empirical studies exports and FDI are jointly determined because MNE 
evidently pursue value-maximizing and transaction-cost minimizing in their location 
choices (different costs and demand-side factors), particularly when exporting turns to 
investments because of higher tariffs. It is also apparent that large export and FDI flows 
occur between same countries, such as between China and USA or Germany, or similar 
31 
 
countries with bilateral affinities as similar income level or language and culture, e.g. 
between China and Singapore or the USA and Western European countries (Appendix 2).  
 
2.3.2 National competitive advantages of countries 
 
Perhaps the most thorough presentation of location factors that affect FDI and other 
international operations is Porter's national diamond model of countries‟ competitive 
advantages (1990). Although the model has been developed mainly from the standpoint 
of the competitiveness of domestic market in the international competition, it is also 
applicable in the discussion of FDI location because the investing foreign MNEs also try 
to benefit from the national competitive advantages. The model consists of four attributes 
of a country which together create the environment that promotes or impedes formation 
of competitive advantage, i.e. which either attracts or withhold foreign business activities, 
e.g. FDI. According to Porter, the attributes are a mutually reinforcing system so that they 
have to be systematically organized to be fully effective, and they are 1) factor conditions, 
2) demand conditions, 3) related and supporting industries, and 4) firm strategy, structure 
and rivalry. (Porter 1990, 72; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 324). 
 
The first attribute, factor conditions, includes available natural resources and locally 
created capabilities such as skilled labour, knowledge and capital resources as well 
infrastructure that are necessary to compete in particular industry. The first three can be 
mobile between different locations and countries, and thus they are somewhat more fluid 
and available for purchase out of the country. Furthermore, basic factors as natural 
resources, climate, geographical location, a number of unskilled labour and debt capital 
are passively inherited, whereas advanced factors, for example IT infrastructure, highly 
educated personnel and R&D facilities, depend on the level of development of the 
particular country. Respectively, the lack or uncompetitiveness of these factors reduces 
the attractiveness of a country as an FDI destination. (Porter 1990, 74-77; Dunning & 
Lundan 2008; 324). Small developed countries tend to have „location-disadvantage‟ in 
capital resources and a number of unskilled labour thus making the basic production more 
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expensive and less attractive for foreign investors, whereas usually their strengths are in 
the developed infrastructure and trained workforce. 
 
The second attribute, the demand conditions stand for the nature of domestic demand for 
the products and services in the particular industry. From the standpoint of a foreign 
investor, the most important characteristics are the composition of demand (i.e. the nature 
of buyers‟ needs) as well as the size and growth of demand. Demand conditions are often 
highly dependent on cultural and lingual similarities between the host market and foreign 
MNEs. Moreover, a developed consumer market can act as a platform or test bed for 
companies with new products because of its anticipative nature to forthcoming global hit 
products (earlier e.g. Japan for electronics or robot devices). One influential factor is the 
segment structure of demand because every nation has its own demand priorities. This 
might make a small developed economy an attractive niche market if local demand in a 
certain segment is large but internationally it is relative small. 
 
The third attribute of the national diamond, and a potential attractiveness factor for small 
developed economies, is a presence (or absence) and international competitiveness of 
suppliers and related industries, especially clusters and agglomerations of them (Porter 
1990, 100-107; Ledyaeva et al. 2010). Advanced downstream industries provide an 
access to the most cost-effective inputs to foreign companies. Benefit is the largest when 
there is a close process of innovation and upgrading between local world-class suppliers 
with international positions and the industry, i.e. a cluster where R&D and market 
information, new ideas and solutions and innovations are accessible for present 
companies. Again, a company can share activities in value chain with players in related 
industries when competing, or which are involved in complementary products that 
enhance company‟s competitive position (e.g. computers-software or mobile phones-
networks). These also provide extensive information flow and other interchange between 
competitive domestic companies and foreign investing MNEs. 
 
Finally, the extent of inter-firm rivalry as well as innovatory and competitive strategies of 
local companies have their own impact on business environment for foreign companies, 
i.e. what is the level and quality of the rivalry (e.g. the number and vitality of global and 
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domestic competitors in the market) and how orientated local firms are toward global 
competition and international demand (Porter 1990, 107-124). Tough competition usually 
lower prices, improve quality and service as well as create new innovations. It also often 
means that markets are not stiffen or distorted by governmental interventions, although 
this is not always the case, for example in the present China.  
 
In addition to above mentioned four attributes, Porter (1990, 126-129) mentions several 
ways how the host governments can influence positively or negatively in each of above-
mentioned attributes, and thus the FDI host country environment. It can shape factor 
conditions through subsidies, policies toward capital markets, investing in research and 
education etc. In demand conditions effects governmental policies are more indirect, e.g. 
product standards and regulations that steer buyers‟ needs, but government and public 
companies could also be substantial buyers of many products themselves and thus affect 
greatly in prevailing demand conditions. Furthermore, government can influence the 
related and support industries e.g. by regulations of supporting services, and firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry by taxation, capital market regulation, antitrust law or requirements 
for a certain level of domestic-content of sold products (Caves 1996, 35). Other 
governmental actions that affect strongly the investment and business environment are, 
for example, incentives for foreign investors or foreign exchange policy, e.g. an attempt 
to hold the value of local currency down in order to lower the cost level and thus improve 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, in a long-run it reduces domestic companies‟ pressure to 
develop, which has clear effect on FDI flows if rate changes are expected to be long-lived 
(Caves 1996, 55). 
 
2.3.3 Dunning’s location advantages 
 
Next, earlier introduced L-advantages of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm have been 
elaborated more in-depth and how each kind of location factors affects each motive type 
on Dunning‟s FDI motive taxonomy. Dunning divides host country determinants (L-
advantage) of FDI in three fields: 1) general policy framework (economic, political and 
social stability, good governance, competition & M&A policies, IPR, industrial policies 
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and cluster development, trade policy), 2) policies specific to FDI (bilateral investment 
agreements, investment incentives and services, social amenities as the schools, quality 
and safety of life etc.) and 3) economic determinants by a type of investment motives. 
These economic determinants are further classified into factors which affect FDI location 
decisions in Dunning‟s taxonomy of FDI motives in Table 2. (Dunning, 1998; Dunning 
2002, 418-424; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 323-327). 
 
Table 3. Factors affecting FDI location decisions classified by FDI motives. 
FDI motive Location factors
Resource seeking FDI - cost of land and property, raw materials and components
- availability and cost of both unskilled and (increasingly) 
skilled labour
Efficiency seeking FDI - above mentioned costs compared with their productivity
- transportation and communcation costs
- membership of a regional integration agreement (e.g. EU 
or eurozone
- quality of market-facilitating institutions
Asset seeking FDI - competition and M&A policies
- technological, managerial and other created assets
- physical infrastructure
- Innovatory, entrepreneurial and educational capacity
Market seeking FDI - market size & growth
- income level
- local consumer preferences
- structure of markets
- physical and cultural distance between home and host 
country
- access to regional and global markets 
(importance growing)
 
Source: Modified from Dunning & Lundan 2008, 325-326. 
 
As Porter earlier, also Dunning and Lundan (2008, 326) emphasizes the crucial role of 
host country government reflecting FDI locational factors. Most national and regional 
governments are nowadays eager to attract inward FDI because they are sources of 
capital and employment as well as a possible offering of new technologies. In other 
words, the greater their local value added, the greater is the contribution to local society 
(McCann & Mudambi 2004). For enhancing inward FDI the government has to offer 
functional institutions and institutional support which the foreign MNE needs. Investment 
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promotion policies (including “invest-in” functions at home and abroad) are important as 
well as regulations and incentives that are directed to nurture entering foreign companies 
and their investments. In addition, there are several other location advantages that do not 
directly appear in Table 2 but form the environment for foreign investors. One of the 
most significant is the openness of country, which includes several features such as the 
multiculturalism and tolerance of different religions and ideologies, the number of 
immigrants, level of cross-border commerce and number of foreign companies operating 
in the country. Thus, here the term „openness‟ is broader than the definition of the small 
and open economy in Chapter 1.4. The others are level of economic, social and 
institutional development, and pattern of governance (e.g. freedom of speech and human 
rights). 
 
2.3.4 Networks affecting FDI location decision  
 
One of the less discussed but strongly FDI location channeling factor is international 
networks of a company and people. Chen & Chen (1998) argue that firm-specific 
advantages, the availability of local resources and the possibility for network linkages 
interact with each other to produce the final decision on FDI location. According to the 
network approach, FDI means a link made between domestic and foreign networks. In the 
today‟s world technology development is faster and product life cycles shorter than 
earlier. In addition, the costs of organizing and monitoring market transactions are high, 
thus companies increasingly need for cooperation. Moreover, nowadays it is perceived 
that foreign market penetration and business expansion is almost impossible without 
building relationships and networks with private and public organizations and individuals. 
It is discovered empirically that especially smaller companies try to benefit from the local 
personal networks and economies of scale and scope through the networks, whereas 
larger companies make more independent investments and utilize global field-specific 
networks. Organizing company‟s economic activities internationally through a market or 
within a firm is expensive, difficult and resource demanding. This is why the organizing 
is more and more often made via networks, so that a company is able to reduce 
transaction and governance costs, especially when foreign networks are alike with 
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MNE‟s home networks (Chen & Chen 1998; Wilska 2002, 28; Yang 2006, 63-64). The 
important and sometimes crucial dimension of networks is a sense of trust and mutual 
dependence between the human actors in a relationship. Especially in complex, different 
or distant markets this sense of trust is vital for the company‟s decision makers so that 
they are willing to highly commit in a more or less unknown country or market. Ready 
networks help a potential investor to join in these foreign networks, in other words 
agglomeration and clusters increase FDI into area because of their existing networks 
(Chen & Chen 1998). Accessible networks also help a company to progress in its 
internationalization process rapidly, e.g. in cases of „born global‟ companies which 
managers usually have both technological expertise and experience of international 
business with ready contacts and networks abroad which impact in investment location 
decisions (Welch et al 2007, 38-39). 
 
Particularly when international networks are alike as at home the adaptation is easy and 
transaction-costs decrease. Networks have also noticed to be especially useful when a 
company is entering into „primitive‟ markets because lack of advanced market institutes 
Chen & Chen (1998) demonstrated that network linkages are important determinants of 
investment locations because, for example, the Taiwanese companies have been good at 
compensating their internal shortcomings by networking. Meanwhile the networks lessen 
the risks of internationalization without having to use only exporting and international 
licensing for risk reduction. The Taiwanese have successfully invested in mainland China 
and Southeast Asia partly because of similarity of local business communities with the 
Chinese ones. On the other hand, if SMEs lean only on local networks in its 
internationalization process it clearly reduces their number of possible choices between 
different locations and investment modes (Chen & Chen 1998). 
 
In sum, it seems clear that the most important factors that affect FDI location decisions 
are macroeconomic environment, general economic infrastructure and socio-political 
stability, and the most important single factors are market size as well as development 
and prospects of it (e.g. in China and India), price-level, quality and price of labour, level 
of technology and already existing companies and industries in the target country, natural 
resources, favourable legislation and taxation, and access/supply of capital and financing 
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(Wilska 2002, 39; Welch et al 2007, 345). As the Chinese FDI is a relatively novel 
phenomenon, the explanatory power of the older FDI theories, such as least cost location 
and product-cycle theories, is rather negligible. On the contrary, FDI location factors 
introduced e.g. by Dunning and Porter in his national diamond seem to be relevant also in 
the case of the Chinese FDI but the importance of some factors are obviously different for 
the Chinese investors than for investors in the traditional investment countries. This 
conclusion can be made by observing the destinations and business sectors of the Chinese 
FDI, as well as special factors that affect FDI decision making in China. These special 
characteristics of the Chinese investment are discussed in the next chapters. 
 
2.4 Special features of the Chinese outward FDI environment 
 
Chinese outward FDI is a relatively new phenomenon both in the global economy and 
general FDI literature. Amount of literature about mainland Chinese foreign investments 
was especially scarce until the late 1990s. Overall, during previous decades the FDI 
literature paid only a little attention to FDI from developing countries, Lall (1983) and 
Wells (1983) as rare examples. Since then the number of publications about developing 
country MNE and FDI has gradually increased along with the fast growth of the outward 
FDI from developing countries within the latest decades. The Chinese FDI have increased 
dramatically since the turn of the millennium, which has increased both academic, 
economic and political interest in them considerably. In fact, in the 2000s China‟s share 
of the total outward FDI from developing countries has grown so large - 20.9% of flow 
and 8.5% of stock in 2009 according to World Investment Report 2010 (UNCTAD 2010) 
- that it has gained a more prominent and influential position both in the literature of FDI 
from developing countries and even in the general FDI literature. 
 
In many respects, Chinese foreign investment activities have been seen rather similar to 
other developing countries but there are also divergences from the standard model of 
emerging country FDI (e.g. Buckley et al 2008b). As mentioned earlier, the OLI 
paradigm explains the FDI phenomenon mainly in such a way that it is a vehicle for 
MNEs to exploit their ownership advantages and firm-specific assets abroad. However, 
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usually this is not the case of MNE of developing countries that possess only limited 
ownership advantages to exploit so their FDI tend to be acquisitions of the needed assets, 
and this has been the case also with the many Chinese FDI (Athreye & Kapur, 2009). On 
the other hand, several authors (e.g. Taylor 2002) have perceived that the growth rate of 
China‟s outward FDI has been faster than in other similar developing countries, and, for 
instance, China has proceeded in Dunning‟s introduced investment development path 
(IDP) quicker than it would be expected of the overall economic development in China 
(Dunning & Lundan 2008, 330-336; Dunning et al. 2008, 164; Zhang 2009). Thereby the 
recent boom of the Chinese outward FDI has called into question, how well the 
traditional FDI and MNE theories are able to cover the phenomenon and what are the 
factors that have enabled such a rapid growth (Zhang 2009).  
 
Buckley et al (2007) have highlighted three themes that are specific for the Chinese FDI 
in contrast to general FDI theories and in some extent also to the theories of FDI from 
other developing countries. These themes are capital market imperfections, special 
ownership and country advantages of Chinese MNEs as well as institutional factors.  
 
Capital market imperfections affect the Chinese investment in many ways. Since the bank 
system in China is largely controlled by the state and the largest commercial banks are 
state-owned, many Chinese companies have been able to borrow below market rates 
(Warner et al., 2004). Besides the banks, also a state-owned conglomerate China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) and China Investment 
Corporation (CIC), a sovereign wealth fund with allocated assets from the enormous 
stock of foreign exchange reserves of the Chinese government, have extensively 
supported the Chinese companies‟ „conquest of the world‟ (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007; 
Gugler & Boie 2008). Especially large state-owned enterprises (SOE) and some private 
„national champions‟ have benefited from cheap capital and other support from the 
government, while one of the main reasons for private companies to make FDI have been 
to secure their domestic foreign exchange e.g. from sales profit or by raising finance from 
international sources, particularly from Hong Kong (Wu & Chen 2001; Buckley et al. 
2007; Buckley et al. 2008b; Gugler & Boie 2008; Zhang 2009). In addition, the Chinese 
government has protected above-mentioned 'national champions' from competition on the 
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domestic market and granted them (e.g. for Haier, Sinochem Group and Shougang Group) 
special permits to set up financial companies, to acquire a majority of local banks and to 
establish joint ventures with foreign insurance companies to ensure the funding of foreign 
activities (Liu & Li 2002; Child & Rodrigues 2005; Buckley et al. 2007). Secondly, the 
inefficient banking system also admits risky low-interest loans and other subsidies for 
potential conglomerate investors, often pressured by the local government and the party 
(Child & Rodrigues 2005; Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007). Buckley et al. (2007; 2008a) 
have noticed that the Chinese MNEs are not too political or economic risk-aversed in 
their FDI and they do not benefit from international trade and investment agreements as 
much as the foreign investors in general just because of the political and financial support 
from the Chinese government. In addition, the Chinese family businesses typically 
receive cheap capital for foreign investment from the family members (Erdener & 
Shapiro 2005). Finally, capital market imperfections along with the governmental support 
have apparently facilitated especially Chinese natural resource seeking and strategic asset 
seeking investments, latter particularly in North America and Europe (Taylor 2002). One 
example of this was Lenovo‟s acquisition of IBM personal computer business in 2005 
when Chinese government possessed 57% proportion of the company (Buckley et al., 
2007).  
 
Special ownership advantages are typical for a MNE from developing countries having 
FDI in other developing countries because unlike many MNEs from developed countries 
it has indigenous experience to operate in a developing country context (Buckley et al., 
2007). This is relevant also in the case of the Chinese MNEs although Yang (2003, 36) 
notes that a large portion of the Chinese FDI has been invested in developed countries. 
Basically, MNEs from developing countries have been found to be strong in other 
developing countries because of their apparent experience and capability to offer 
appropriate goods and services to smaller markets with low purchasing power per capita, 
i.e. downscaling technology by making manufacturing more labour-intensive or using 
local raw-materials, or cope with weak and corrupted governance (UNCTAD 2006, 104 
& 117; Zhang 2009). Similarly, also Chinese companies are well adjusted to a poor 
institutional environment with corruption and governmental interventions and thus are 
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often more successful in developing countries with demanding business and political 
environment than their western rivals (Morck et al. 2008; Kolstad & Wiig 2009).  
 
Institutional factors are crucial either as a conducive or constraining factor for FDI. 
Bureaucracy and cumbersome permit application processes have been clearly reducing 
the amount of foreign investments in comparison with the wealth and investment 
potential of China, but they have also been reflected in the illegal and informal 
investments abroad (Taylor 2002; Buckley et al. 2007).  In China, the government affects 
companies‟ investments, their orientation and companies‟ foreign strategies significantly 
e.g. through the application processes and control of foreign currency exchange.  
Furthermore, foreign acquisitions, for instance, are still approved on a case-by-case basis 
and thus they are strictly examined before the approval (von Zedtwitz 2005, 64). The 
application process of FDI permit goes through the examinations by National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and state owned banks. Also the 
State Council as well as Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs may intervene in the 
process (Gugler & Boie 2008; Buckley et al. 2008b). Relational framework between the 
leaders of the internationalizing companies and the institutions is crucial, and the leaders 
commonly negotiate about strategic choices with representatives of the institutions, 
although this is in commonplace in many Western countries as well (Child & Rodrigues 
2005), e.g. between companies and Tekes or Finnvera in Finland.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned advantages from capital market imperfections and 
special ownership advantages, Chinese MNEs also possess other country- and some firm-
specific advantages (CSA and FSA). Several Chinese MNEs are successful because of 
country‟s huge reserve of cheap labor and production process capabilities which provide 
cost competitiveness for their products and services compared with their foreign rivals 
(Rugman & Doh 2008, 201; Gugler & Boie 2008). Second, as latecomers some Chinese 
enterprises have gradually managed to create their own firm-specific advantages as a 
result from cooperation with advanced foreign companies in China, i.e. they have 
undergone ”inward internationalization” (Child & Rodrigues 2005). They have managed 
to imitate and adopt new technology, to acquire foreign business and distribution contacts 
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as well as experience in foreign business practices. Third, competition in China‟s 
domestic markets is fierce which has forced especially private firms to foster their cost 
effectiveness (Child & Rodrigues 2005). Moreover, in recent years the Chinese 
government has significantly increased its spending on R&D, although less at basic 
research, which also have visible results in the success of Chinese companies, such as 
Huawei‟s rise to the world‟s largest company in number of patent filings in 2008 (Gugler 
& Boie 2008; Xinhuanet 2009).  
 
However, besides institutional factors the Chinese companies have also other 
disadvantages which have yet reduced their ability to make even a more substantial 
number of FDI or caused failures in the existing FDI cases. According to Wu & Chen 
(2001), still in the 2000s the Chinese often make their foreign investments on the basis of 
very small information and they do not have a clear plan why to invest abroad as well as 
where and how to develop foreign markets. The government urges the Chinese SOEs to 
grow large international players with a tight schedule and consequently they have often 
made rather hasty foreign investments. Gugler & Boie (2008), in turn, remark that the 
Chinese companies are lacking of knowledge-based advantages. According to Rugman 
(2008, 96-97), most of the Chinese companies still lack a system integration skills, which 
are typical of successful Western MNEs, and therefore the acquired assets cannot be 
maintained. The Chinese MNEs have difficulties in integrate and maintain the benefits 
from M&A in the firm because of weak internal management, strategy and branding 
skills, and unlike natural resources, for instance, only a few Chinese MNEs have 
managed to acquire particular advanced and useful technologies. In general, the Chinese 
governmental agencies assess that even 75% of the acquisitions have failed (von Zedtwitz 
2005, 63). Nevertheless, the fact that the Chinese acquisitions in Europe have largely 
targeted in poorly performed companies might have its own influence in above-
mentioned difficulties (Athreye & Kapur 2009). In addition, the Chinese have lacked a 
strategic vision and experience of a cross-border coordination of their business activities, 
which is one reason that companies have suffered losses abroad although the situation is 
improving nowadays (Child & Rodrigues 2005).  
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Rugman  lists (2008, 97) that “the Chinese firms are protected, resourse-based, labor-
intensive, low technology and inefficient”, and that the potential and effective Chinese 
SMEs seek cooperation rather with the foreign MNEs than the Chinese SOEs, which are 
inefficient and not accustomed to business competition because of their domestic 
dominant monopoly position. In addition, few SOEs compete seriously in the 
international market, but their objectives are usually more in home country. Child & 
Rodrigues (2005) also take into account that a product differentiation by the Chinese 
companies has not developed far enough to enable them to compete effectively in 
consumer markets. Furthermore, they see that other weaknesses of the Chinese MNEs are 
excessive insistence on the behaviour of Chinese culture and organizational models 
which is a burden in different cultural contexts from China and East Asia, i.e. they suffer 
problems from a liability of foreignness. Also, many Chinese companies may even be too 
dependent on the support of the government and the Chinese networks, and thus they may 
be unable to compete in areas where this support is small or absent. Ignorance of 
international and local commercial laws as well as local governmental policies has 
noticed to be the weakness of the Chinese investors (Taylor 2002). Finally, China is still 
the fastest-growing major market in the world so for most of the domestic enterprises 
there is still little incentive to leave the country for less growing and more saturated 
markets, such as those in small developed economies (von Zedtwitz 2005, 66). 
 
2.5 Motives of the Chinese FDI 
 
In the literature, the motives of the Chinese investment FDI have been mostly discussed 
through the Dunning‟s taxonomy of FDI motives that is introduced earlier in Chapter 2.2. 
In this chapter, besides the motives of Dunning‟s taxonomy also some other FDI motives 
are elaborated that are typical for the Chinese investors. 
 
According to the FIAS/MIGA/IFC/CCER survey on China‟s outward FDI in 2005, where 
150 Chinese MNEs were interviewed, the most common motive for the Chinese FDI was 
market seeking (85% of the respondent firms regarded it as an important motive for their 
investments), then strategic asset seeking (51%), resource seeking (40%) and finally 
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efficiency seeking (39%) (UNCTAD 2006, 153 & 167-168). Also, in Deng‟s survey 
(2009) market seeking was found as the most frequent motive for the Chinese FDI 
although he found that strategic assets and efficiency seeking were almost equally 
common motives. However, the monetary value of Chinese FDI does not spread the same 
way between different investment motives as numerous small Chinese companies make a 
lot of small-scale market seeking FDI, and resource seeking FDI are usually made by 
fewer but larger investors. According to Gugler & Boei (2008), the three largest Chinese 
outward investors are all in the industry of natural resource. In the public discussion, the 
biggest attention has been paid to the Chinese resource and strategic asset seeking FDI, 
not least because they are often performed via foreign acquisitions (Deng 2009). As a 
difference from other developing countries, strategic asset seeking has a more visible role 
in the Chinese FDI scene (Gugler & Boie 2008). 
 
2.5.1 Chinese FDI motives in Dunning’s taxonomy 
 
China possesses rather the limited extent of domestic natural resources, except the rich 
deposits of certain materials e.g. coal and iron ore. Besides other natural resources, also 
sources of energy have found to be inadequate for supporting country‟s rapid economic 
growth and consumption of raw materials and other inputs over last decades (Buckley et 
al. 2008b), although it has the largest resources of hydropower in the world (CIA 2010). 
Thus China has made large natural resource seeking FDI especially in Russia, Africa as 
well as East and Central Asia, e.g. in copper mining in Zambia (Buckley et al. 2008b), 
and in gas pipelines and oil refining in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan  to ensure a supply 
of resources for increasing domestic needs (The New York Times 2009). This indicates 
that those investments are not driven by the regional proximity but availability of assets 
(Gugler & Boie 2008). As mentioned earlier, most of resource seeking investments have 
been made by large Chinese state-owned companies, such as China Natural Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Sinopec and 
Shanghai Baosteel, along with remarkable aid in development and favourable loans to the 
host countries by the Chinese government. Taking this into account it is not surprising 
that there has been a strong dispute if the aid has been granted mainly to ensure market 
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access and exploitation of natural resources for Chinese MNEs (Buckley et al. 2008a, 133; 
Buckley et al. 2008b).  
 
In addition, MNEs from developing economies have supposed to make chiefly 
knowledge and technology oriented investments in industrialized countries, but China has 
also made substantially resource seeking investments in many developed countries, such 
as in the USA and Canada, and recently in Australia where mining sector counts over 85% 
of the Chinese investments (MOFCOM 2010). The latter two countries are sometimes 
considered to belong to the group of small developing economies, because of their 
relatively small populations. Otherwise it is apparent that natural resource seeking has not 
been the driver of the Chinese MNEs to invest in small developed economies, as their 
advantages are rarely in natural resources, and almost never in cheap labor. While the 
Chinese are quite interested in, for instance, mining acquisitions also in these countries, 
apparently the largest reserves and the least-utilized natural resources can still be found 
either in geographically large countries or developing countries. Furthermore, it is 
possible that for China as a latecomer foreign investor, it has better opportunities for 
natural resource investments mainly in poorly governed countries instead of developed 
countries with the established ownership of natural resources (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). 
  
Chinese companies' international competitiveness rests largely on cheap domestic labour, 
hence foreign markets are served by exports. However, customs tariffs have forced many 
Chinese companies to make defensive market seeking FDI to dodge imposed tariffs or to 
reduce a risk of possible duties in countries and regions whereby China has a significant 
trade surplus, such as the USA and EU (Buckley et al. 2008b). The Chinese have also 
increased market seeking FDI in manufacturing especially in relatively cheap countries 
within a free trade area in order to serve as an export-platform for bigger and richer 
markets in the area, e.g. investments in Mexico to sell to the USA (NAFTA) and in 
Eastern European countries to sell e.g. to Germany and France in EU. The latter example 
has been used yet in a smaller scale, obviously because of a lower rate of market growth 
(Buckley et al. 2008b). Also small developed economies in Europe have been interested 
to have export-platform investments from China, mostly for hi-tech products with R&D 
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functions in the host country. These investments have been realized mainly when a 
Chinese MNE has a major corporate client in the host country. 
 
Furthermore, one reason for market seeking FDI has been to acquire foreign distribution 
networks and diminish the dependency on intermediates, international agencies and 
foreign representative companies (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007; Buckley et al. 2008b). 
Kaartemo (2007) found in his research that the Chinese MNEs have made this type of 
FDI also in small developed countries, i.e. their motive has been to internalize and 
supervise the operations in value added chains, such as sales. Also knowledge of the local 
markets has been an important driver for the Chinese FDI in those countries. Besides 
defensive FDI, a growing number of Chinese companies also make offensive market 
seeking FDI particularly towards large countries to develop foreign markets and improve 
brand awareness.  
 
Nowadays they are increasingly competitive in international markets, also in technology-
intensive sectors, and can afford to make large-scale market-seeking FDI. There are good 
examples in the electronics sector as Huawei, Lenovo, ZTE and Haier, for instance. 
These companies have managed to create global company image instead of negative 
„country of origin‟ and „made in China‟ notions which still harm many Chinese 
companies‟ business in foreign markets (Buckley et al 2008; Gugler & Boie 2008). 
Furthermore, the Chinese companies are also driven forward by the low profit margins 
because of the fierce competition at the home market, especially the firms without 
significant differentiation or/and brand advantage, and by their overcapacity in China, 
where the demand is possibly not large enough or average purchase power is low (Wu & 
Chen 2001; Child & Rodrigues 2005). Deng (2009) has found that market seeking FDI 
are popular particularly e.g. in steel, chemical, textiles, building materials, energy, 
transportation and household appliance industries. 
 
As explained earlier, efficiency seeking FDI are usually done for reorganizing and 
rationalizing existing resource- or market-based investments regionally or globally to 
gain from common government policies and other standards, and thus benefits in 
production of scale etc. In case of the Chinese MNEs, these types of FDI are not 
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numerous yet because presently few of them have several foreign investments or other 
operations that need for reorganizing and if so, most commonly in South-East Asia where 
there are also able to benefit from the internal market of ASEAN (Buckley et al. 2008a, 
115; Buckley et al. 2008b; Gugler & Boie 2008). Only the very largest Chinese MNEs 
with extensive service and sales networks have made efficiency seeking FDI in small 
developed economies, although their interest in this has been on the rise since the global 
value added chains have spread wider also into the small developed economies 
(Kaartemo 2007). On the other hand, normally Chinese companies do not need to seek 
production efficiency and cost minimization abroad as domestic labor costs are low 
(Deng 2004). Although manufacturing costs have increased in the coastal regions of 
China, the prevailing direction of the Chinese manufacturing site transfer is to the inland 
territories within the country although Vietnam, for instance, would have the same 
benefits of cheapness with better logistical accessibility (Gugler & Boie 2008). 
 
As the international competitiveness and wealth of the Chinese MNEs have gradually 
strengthened, currently their focus on foreign operations is shifting from gathering of 
generic market information and foreign operation knowledge to connecting the 
knowledge with technology-intensive research, production and local market information 
(Buckley et al. 2008b). Thus strategic asset seeking FDI are rarely individual investments 
but rather hand-in-hand, for instance, with market seeking FDI where the acquired assets 
are utilized (Gugler & Boie 2008). The Chinese MNEs are making strategic asset seeking 
FDI, for example, by establishing or acquiring R&D oriented units in technologically 
advanced high-income countries with hi-tech clusters, especially in Europe and North 
America, in order to support their manufacturing of technology-intensive products in 
home country and exporting to foreign markets. R&D investments have been particularly 
made by electronic communications, electrical and chemical industries (Deng 2009).  
 
Another motive for strategic asset seeking investments is global brands (Child & 
Rodrigues 2005). Few Chinese companies as Haier, Lenovo and Neusoft (software) have 
used their original Chinese brands also in foreign markets but most have ended up to 
acquire well-known foreign brands, e.g. Thomson and Alcatel by Chinese TCL and more 
recently Volvo by Chinese Geely Automobile in Sweden (BBC 2009). Brand and other 
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strategic asset purchases by the Chinese have increased because of their accumulated 
assets of foreign currency from grown sales and recently also because the global 
economic crisis has decreased the values of the acquired company and brand values. 
Cheap loans from large state-owned banks have also enabled remarkable purchases, just 
as in the above-mentioned case of Geely Automobile (The Wall Street Journal 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, most of the Chinese have a little experience of 
managing intangible assets so it has been questioned if their companies are able to 
generate profits from the acquisitions, and furthermore, acquired companies have usually 
been in weak economic situation which possibly decreases the likelihood of success 
(Buckley et al. 2008). Third obvious motive for strategic asset seeking is to gain access to 
international capital markets as they are still rather inefficient, if emerging, in mainland 
China (Deng 2004). For instance, several large Chinese companies, e.g. banks, insurance, 
petroleum and telecom companies, have been listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange to 
finance their domestic parent companies in China (Buckley et al. 2008b). In his survey, 
Deng (2009) found that much the same industries have made strategic asset seeking FDI 
as make market seeking FDI, i.e. steel, building materials, energy, transportation and 
household appliances, but also postal service and finance industries. 
 
2.5.2 Distinct motives of the Chinese FDI 
 
Besides Dunning‟s FDI motive taxonomy, there are some other distinct motives behind 
the Chinese FDI as well. The minimization or avoidance of taxes is a motive for 
financially really substantial proportion of the Chinese FDI especially in Hong Kong, the 
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Macau etc. although it is a relatively common 
motive for the FDI from other countries as well (Buckley et al 2008; Deng 2009). This 
kind of FDI might be made for obtaining venture capital and gaining status of foreign 
investment when reinvesting back in mainland China, or for reinvestments to third 
countries via tax-free holding companies or even for concealing wealth from the Chinese 
tax authorities. However, these money flows are difficult to verify because of a strong 
secrecy for FDI in those locations (Morck et al. 2008; Kolstad & Wiik 2009). 
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Furthermore, Wu & Chen (2001) assume that there is „capital flight‟ from China in order 
to protect capital from the risk of inflation and exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Next, according to Deng (2004) the Chinese government has supported large corporations, 
mostly trading SOEs with a monopolistic status at home markets, after Japanese and 
Korean trading houses to expand abroad in order to diversify their business and hence 
diversify the risk as well. This type of investments have been made e.g. by Sinochem 
(China National Chemicals Import & Export Corporation) and China Resources 
Enterprise, both state-owned companies. Behind governmental aid policies there have 
also been motives of promote domestic development, reassert the leadership of the 
current regime as well as support the objective of China‟s foreign policy (Morck et al. 
2008; Kolstad & Wiik 2009). What comes in small developed economies, thus far there 
has not been discussion in the academic literature about risk diversification or politically 
oriented FDI by the Chinese SOEs in those countries. By contrast, one important but even 
generally little discussed motive to invest abroad is a possibility of enjoying the social 
benefits of the Western welfare states including smaller of those, such as Finland and 
Sweden, by gaining residence rights in them (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007). The benefits 
could be e.g. legal protection, social security, free or cheap education and health care 
services, and safe and clean environment for family life (Deng 2004). This is a relevant 
motive particular to smaller Chinese family companies. 
  
Finally, when discussing about investment motives it must be taken into account that 
there are several domestic push factors that force Chinese companies to channel their 
interest abroad. Like many foreign companies, also Chinese technology-intensive firms 
are suffering from the poor business environment in China and thus they are looking for 
more profitable and safer business operations abroad. For instance, weak IPR 
development spurs companies to prefer technology M&A utilization abroad (Athreye & 
Kapur 2009). Other push factors might be the lack and expensiveness of skilled human 
resources - especially management experts - in China, very low profit margins from 
overcapacity in many sectors, poor infrastructure especially outside of the tier-I cities that 
increases transportation costs as well as flaming competition with leading global 
companies and brands (Gugler & Boie 2008). For domestic non-government enterprises 
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there are also other shortcomings as domestic regional protectionism, non-secured raw 
material supply from home markets because of competition between the areal 
development (Wang 2002), limited access to capital as well as interference, 
unpredictability and corruption of local government and judiciary which both hinder and 
restrain business operations and raise transaction costs in domestic markets (Gugler & 
Boie 2008; Child & Rodrigues 2005). All these factors drive the Chinese companies to 
invest abroad as long as they are able and approved to FDI. Furthermore, the Western 
developed countries are obviously the most demanding FDI destination for the Chinese as 
a success there requires both resources as well as technological and management skills 
more than the other regions in the world. 
  
In the next chapter, the Chinese FDI specific host country location factors are discussed. 
These factors are country specific advantages, i.e. pull-drivers that have been found to 
attract the Chinese investments into certain destinations. 
 
2.6 Host country location factors of the Chinese FDI 
 
Generally, the Chinese investments have been mainly directed by the same factors and 
location advantages, which have also been discussed within the general FDI location 
literature. Kolstad & Wiik (2009) found in their research that the Chinese FDI have been 
mostly attracted by tax havens (especially Hong Kong and offshore destinations in the 
Caribbean Sea), geographically close countries to China (East and Southeast Asian 
countries), resource-rich countries (e.g. Africa, Australia and the former Soviet Union 
countries), as well as large markets such as the USA and Germany. In other words, small 
developed economies and their location advantages have not been among the most 
attractive ones of the Chinese FDI. Buckley et al. (2007; 2008a, 130-138), in turn, found 
that the most notable factors for the location of the Chinese investment have been the size 
of the economy (particularly in OECD countries) and other demand conditions, factor 
input costs, the quality of infrastructure, the host country's economic development level 
compared with China as the Chinese have made a lot of market seeking FDI in other 
developing countries, the exploitability of natural resources, a degree of liberalization of 
50 
 
investment policy in a host country, host county‟s membership in WTO, cultural 
proximity to China and a number of the ethnic Chinese in a host country.  
 
According to UNCTAD (2006, 156-157), the usual pull-drivers to the Chinese FDI as 
well as investments from other developing countries are market size, high purchasing 
power and liberal host government policies. These policies include not only incentives 
and tax-reductions, but also mature procedures as governmental transparency, protective 
IPR legislation, and cheap money transactions along with a developed banking system. 
Other macroeconomic pull-drivers include political stability, strong and stable currencies, 
or belonging to a common monetary area, such as the euro area. From the point of view 
of the small developed economies, the focal pull-drivers mentioned above are specific 
demand conditions (e.g. for cutting-edge hi-tech products) and high purchasing power per 
capita, the quality of infrastructure (both physical and telecommunications), liberal 
investment policy for FDI and developed legislation and banking systems, political 
stability and a safe environment, as well as stable currency probably in the euro area. 
Certainly other factors matter in those countries as well. Good geographical location and 
possible special natural resources affect positively the amount of the Chinese investment 
in small developed countries, as well as a large size of the ethnic Chinese minority, but 
they are general pull-factors that apply with host countries of all kind.  
 
Next, Buckley et al. (2007) found that the exchange and inflation rates, the transparency 
of the host country market and the geographical proximity are insignificant host country 
location factors for the Chinese FDI, from which the latter one is inconsistent with the 
above mentioned results of Kolstad & Wiik (2009). However, the changing domestic 
exchange rate might become a push-driver for the Chinese investments as Child & 
Rodrigues (2005) presume that the probable appreciation of the Chinese yuan will 
increase the volume of outward FDI, just as occurred in Japan in the 1980s. In addition, 
apparently the large Chinese minorities and their networks in South-East Asia affect more 
an investment willingness of the mainland Chinese than mere geographical proximity. 
Finally, China's own exports to a host country obviously also increases the amount of the 
Chinese FDI in the country. Imports to China have the same increasing effect upon the 
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Chinese FDI in a host country, but weaker (Buckley et al. 2007). This trend is similar also 
in the small developed economies, as will be demonstrated in the Chapter 4.1. 
  
2.6.1 Distinct features in the location factors of the Chinese FDI 
 
The above mentioned factors are relatively common host country location factors both for 
the Chinese FDI and FDI from every country. However, there are also some distinct 
features in the location factors of the Chinese FDI. At the beginning of the 
internationalization process of China, the FDI were not located in the neighbouring 
countries (excluding Hong Kong), unlike the internationalization theory predicts, but in 
the 1980s and 1990s most of the investment went to the far-flung Western countries, 
especially in North America and Australia (Yang 2003, 21; Li 2007). Those FDI were 
partly politically inflected heavy industrial investments or they supported the SOEs‟ 
export activities in the countries with high purchasing power (Wang 2002; Buckley et al. 
2008a SIVU; Buckley et al. 2008b). Later on the location choices of Chinese FDI have 
followed more the internationalization theory, i.e. internationalization starts from the 
nearest regions, especially by the smaller family enterprises (Erdener & Shapiro 2005). 
Asia has clearly been as the base for the Chinese FDI for the past two decades. In 2009, 
even over 75% of the Chinese FDI stock was invested in Asia (MOFCOM 2010).  
 
Characteristically, the Chinese FDI directions are heavily controlled by the state and it 
supports investments to certain preferred countries and sectors to serve its needs 
according to current situations, not without political ambitions (Wang 2002; Buckley et al. 
2008a, 107). Recently the foreign investment focus has shifted in the SOEs‟ FDI in the 
natural resources and acquisition of strategic assets, e.g. the technology and knowhow of 
international business management, while the private SMEs‟ investments have remained 
difficult to implement, especially from outside of the growth centers in China (et al., 
2007). Another special characteristic of the Chinese FDI is that high political or 
economic risk level of host country has actually attracted the Chinese investments, 
against general expectations for FDI behaviour (Buckley et al. 2007). Nor do poor 
institutions or ethical problems seem to affect negatively the Chinese investment, as they 
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usually do to the amount of FDI from developed countries. This is partly explained by the 
institutional factors, i.e. the fact that the Chinese government has put in place risk 
management mechanism in high-risk regions, and the Chinese investments have also 
been supported by the political weight of China and its support in the host countries. 
Governmental support includes a direct financial assistance as well as financing of public 
infrastructure, industrial and agricultural projects (Taylor, 2002; Lum 2009). China has 
close political and economic relationships with many socially labile or non-democratic 
countries, e.g. with Sudan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (The Washington Post 2004; 
Resource Investor 2009). In those countries, the political weight of China decreases the 
level of political and other risks.  
 
As a consequence of the political and financial support from the Chinese government, the 
Chinese investors do not benefit from international trade and investment agreements as 
much as the foreign investors in general, and thus the impact of the agreements on the 
location choices of the Chinese FDI is low (Buckley et al. 2008a, 132-133 & 138). This is 
also the explanation for why investment agreements between China and small developed 
economies have hardly increased the interest of the Chinese MNEs to invest in those 
countries. On the other hand, the agreements strengthen the economic relations of the 
countries at the political level, which is particularly important with governmental led 
economies as China. 
 
Third, a great number of the Chinese investments are channeled via access to networks 
and resources controlled of the ethnic Chinese, hence they often have a crucial role in the 
decisions of FDI location (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Erdener & Shapiro, 2005). A 
widespread Chinese diaspora helps the Chinese investors, especially small companies 
with few firm-specific advantages, to invest and establish themselves abroad because in 
many countries the Chinese minority brings security and reduces transaction costs 
through a familiar language and culture (Child & Rodrigues 2005; Buckley et al., 2007).  
In addition, Tong (2005) has noticed that the ethnical networks have supported the 
Chinese investors particularly in countries with weak institutions, especially in Southeast 
Asia but also elsewhere in the developing world. Networks might also provide necessary 
market information for investors from the point of view of the Chinese type of businesses. 
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Thus the influence of the Chinese networks is important when considering the amount of 
the Chinese FDI in the small developed economies. Knowledge of these countries is not 
very high in China, especially compared with the knowledge about large developed 
countries, and networks are one of the main routes to the Chinese companies to receive 
information from them. 
 
Finally, from the perspective of host countries the Chinese FDI are mainly welcomed and 
many countries have set up their own invest-in operations in mainland China. However, 
unlike the governments in the host countries have wished, the Chinese investments have 
not yielded significant amounts of new, but especially acquisitions have been followed by 
the cuts of personnel. Often newly acquired manufacturing activities are relocated to 
China because of cheaper labour costs while valuable but low employing distribution 
networks are maintained in the host country (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007). Furthermore, 
the technology seeking acquisitions pursued by the Chinese do not bring to the host 
society as much new spillovers as technology-exploiting FDI although they do increase 
competition and hence productivity in the host country (Athreye & Kapur 2009). Many 
host country governments have been concerned the escape of the sensitive technology or 
control over natural resources by the Chinese acquirers which are often closely linked 
with the Chinese government. Also, those acquirers are not necessarily subject to the 
standard reporting required of OECD companies, which reduces the transparency of 
acquisitions. This concern has already led to several cases for example in Canada, Russia 
and the USA where the Chinese acquisitions have been blocked in the name of national 
security (Antkiewicz & Whalley 2007). 
 
2.7 Summary and theoretical framework of the study 
 
In the earlier parts of this chapter the relevant FDI theories to the research questions have 
been introduced with a brief of their historical background. First, the theories and 
frameworks that explain the phenomenon of FDI have been presented. The most 
important of them from the point of view of the modern and Chinese recently made FDI 
are Hymer‟s initial idea of firm-specific advantages, Dunning‟s Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm 
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and Rugman‟s grouping of firm- and country-specific advantages. These together create 
the framework from which to look for motives and location factors which have directed 
the Chinese investments to the small developed economies. 
 
After this, the reasons that motivate companies to make direct investments abroad have 
been presented. Companies generally intend to seek the benefits from the already existing 
firm-specific advantages (i.e. ownership-specific advantages). In addition, FDI motives 
may also be a necessity to obtain various assets abroad which will improve the 
competitiveness of a company both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, as 
push-factor motives might be home country-specific advantages that facilitate 
opportunities for successful investment abroad or, on the other hand, the shortcomings 
and obstacles of the domestic market or operational environment that drive the companies 
to expand their activities abroad to ensure the competitiveness and growth. From this 
basis, the most extensive categorization of the different FDI motives is Dunning‟s 
taxonomy, where motives have been divided into resource-, market-, efficiency- and 
strategic asset seeking investments motives. In addition to those, other FDI motives that 
have been mentioned in the literature include political safety-seeking and risk 
diversification as well as supportive and speculative investment motives. 
 
Unlike the theories and frameworks that explain FDI motives which mainly focus on the 
question why companies make foreign direct investments in general, the theories of the 
determinants of FDI location put forward the reasons why certain types of FDI are 
directed at certain locations, i.e. what are the so-called pull-factors of host countries for 
FDI. These location factors have been historically explained as the cost savings as well as 
product-cycles from the economic and technological centers to the peripheries, but the 
causes have been sought also from the company level, for instance, in the 
internationalization theory. In the literature, the most frequently mentioned factors 
funneling FDI locations have been the production costs, features of the foreign markets, 
trade relationships at both country and company levels, existing business and ethnic 
networks, memberships in free-trade areas, the policies of the host government including 
trade barriers, FDI incentives and promotion as well as language and culture similarities.  
FDI host country factors as an entity have the most clearly expressed Porter in his 
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national diamond model and Dunning as location advantages (L-particle) in his above 
mentioned eclectic paradigm. 
 
Next, on the basis of the above-mentioned theories and frameworks one can draw the 
theoretical framework for this particular study (Figure 3). This study aims to examine on 
the one hand what motives, and on the other hand, which variables affecting on location 
have led to the decision of carrying out FDI in a certain host country location. According 
to some authors (e.g. Madhok 1997 and Deng 2009) the third factor that possibly 
influences on the investment decision is the choice of FDI mode. However, it has been 
excluded from the focus of this study as it relates more to the implementation phase of 
the FDI decision and less to the initial impetus to invest abroad than the FDI motives and 
location factors do. In most cases, the company has a FDI motive before it considers the 
questions of location, but they might also be, and often are, concurrent processes. In some 
cases, a business opportunity in particular location may even be an initiative trigger for 
performing FDI, for example, by utilizing business or personal networks. 
 
As mentioned above, according to the previous literature the most important factors 
affecting FDI motives are firm- (ownership-) specific advantages, company‟s needs for 
new asset as well as push-factors from home government and market, i.e. their 
advantages and shortcomings. Motives for FDI decisions are generated on the basis of 
these. On the other hand, FDI location choice is affected by four factors, which are partly 
overlapping. Macro-economic factors include local and regional (host) market features, 
cost level, level of technology and labour skills, natural resources, the structure of 
industry and clusters, foreign trade etc. Company-level factors include company‟s earlier 
business relationships, e.g. supplier or customer relations, rivalry, the specific asset 
needed by the company, e.g. certain technology. Governmental policy factors include 
general legislative and regulatory environment, investment and capital market legislation, 
immigration policy, taxation etc. Finally, non-economic factors include, among others, 
human relationships, climate, language and culture environment and education (although 
governmental policy has a strong influence on it). Together, these are the reasons why a 
company invests in general and why into a specific location, and they vary company-, 
home country- and host country- specifically as well as in the course of time. 
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Figure 3. Framework for the FDI motives and location determinants in the FDI 
decision 
 
 
In this study, the key subjects are the Chinese MNEs which have decided to invest in a 
small developed economy, Finland or Sweden. Thus the left and central parts refer to 
Chinese MNEs and their FDI, and the right side parts refer to a small developed economy 
in Figure 3. Academic literature of the Chinese FDI in small developed countries has 
been nearly non-existent so the literature review of this research has focused mainly on 
the general literature of the Chinese FDI phenomenon. Against this background, this 
study clearly provides novel research information on the subject. 
 
When considering the general applicably of the research results, it has to take into 
account that the Chinese MNEs and China possess some specialties as a foreign investors 
and FDI home country, and thus it differs in certain extent from other developing 
economies and large economies as a FDI home country. Although the Chinese MNEs 
obviously possess special ownership advantages in less developed countries with weak 
institutions, at the general level they still have only a few firm-specific advantages so 
then tend to utilize more acquisitions of the needed assets than MNEs globally. This has 
been enabled by the strong support of the Chinese government as well as capital market 
imperfections in China. However, the institutional factors in China also set hindrances to 
the Chinese FDI and the government has a strong directing force in the FDI decisions of 
both state-owned and private Chinese MNEs. Chinese MNEs can exploit the home 
country-specific advantages abroad, such as cheap labor to product cost competitive 
products for exporting and political support from the Chinese government. In contrary, 
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hard domestic competition and poor IPR protection push companies to internationalize. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese MNEs suffer from poor technological and the managerial 
competitiveness as well as unfamiliarity of foreign markets, culture and legislation. 
 
From Dunning‟s FDI motive taxonomy, most frequent motives for the Chinese FDI have 
been market seeking FDI mostly made by smaller private companies, resource seeking 
FDI made by large SOEs and strategic asset seeking FDI made by technologically and 
managerially advanced, wealthy or government-supported companies. Other visible 
motives for the Chinese FDI have been tax avoidance, risk diversification, political 
ambitions and domesticity issues. 
 
Determinants of location choices in the Chinese FDI are mainly the same as in FDI from 
other countries, i.e. low taxation, geographical and cultural vicinity, amount of natural 
resources as well as market size and high purchase power. Chinese are also attracted by 
social welfare and liberal FDI policies although they are not too risk-sensitive in political 
and economic matters. International or bilateral investment agreements do not necessarily 
increase the Chinese FDI in a particular host country, but poor political relations between 
countries affect negatively the amount of investments from China. By contrary, ethnic 
and business networks have been found to affect strongly on location of the Chinese 
investment. 
 
Empirical part of this study aims to compare how much the Chinese FDI motives and 
location factors in the small developed countries, here in Finland and Sweden, correspond 
with the general literature and are there certain special features in these countries. Before 
the empirical part, however, it is appropriate to present the methodology used in the study. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, the methodology used in the study is introduced. The chapter begins by 
introducing the methodological approach of the study. Next, the data collection method 
and study design are assessed.  Lastly, the q1§qvalidity and reliability of this study are 
discussed. 
 
Moreover, this study is a part of a larger research project of Center for Markets in 
Transition (CEMAT) at the Aalto University School of Economics.  The research project 
is called “Finnish Chinese Business Communication” and it is funded by the Academy of 
Finland and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The project includes five 
separate subprojects and this study is a part of the subproject “Chinese Investments in the 
Baltic Sea Region: Challenges of Intercultural business communication”. Empirical data 
was collected by the research staff of CEMAT and the data has been in use of both the 
staff and writer if this study who was member of the personnel during the data collection.  
 
3.1 Methodological approach 
 
The research method of this study utilizes is a qualitative multiple-case study. A case 
study method is preferred when the research is going to answer questions such as “what 
kind of, how, why”, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon which 
boundaries with the surrounding context are not clearly evident (Yin 2003, 1). Certainly, 
this method is the best applicable to respond to the research questions because of the form 
of the questions. Furthermore, the object of a case study is typically to illustrate a 
comprehensive picture of the phenomenon with a use of different kinds of data, such as 
interviews, media reports and news (Velde et al. 2004, 79).  
 
A multiple-case study is regarded more robust than a single-case study because the 
evidence from multiple cases is usually considered more compelling. This is particular 
relevant in this study where the case companies are highly different in their size and 
business fields. The target in this kind of research environment could be, for instance, to 
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have the subgroups of cases covering each type of conditions of the MNE. Moreover, a 
multiple-case method is used in the replication logic “so that the cases either predict 
similar results (a literal replication) or contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a 
theoretical replication)” (Thiétart et al. 2001, 165; Yin 2003, 46-47). In this study, the 
replication logic is particular suitable for assessing Finland as a FDI location for the 
Chinese, and equivalence of the results in Sweden. Also, even if contexts between the 
cases obviously differ greatly but there are still possibilities to draw common conclusions 
from them, the generalizability of the findings improves notably (Yin 2003, 53). 
 
In addition to the above, it is worth to go through some relevant aspects of case study 
methods from the standpoint of this study. Firstly, in a case study the structuring of data 
and analyzing the results are necessary parts after the collection of data. Yin (2003, 151-
155) introduces six case study structures: linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, 
suspense, theory building and unsequenced structures, of which Velde et al. (2004, 83-84) 
raises the four former mentioned as the most important ones. Linear-analytical is the 
standard approach when composing research reports. In it the earlier literature (and 
theory) is compared with the analyzed findings from the collected data. In comparative 
structure the same case study is repeated two or more times comparing alternative 
explanations with the same case. In chronological structure the focus is to describe or 
explore evolution and development in one or more cases. In suspense structure the 
outcome of the study is early presented and the rest part is to explain the results. In this 
study, the earlier literature of the Chinese FDI activities, motives and location choices in 
them is introduced, and the goal of the empirical part is to find and analyze how the 
findings from two small developed economies, Finland and Sweden, are reflected the 
general literature. Thus the most appropriate structure for the study is clearly the linear-
analytic approach. Secondly, this study is based on a larger multi-method research, 
Finnish-Chinese Business Communication. Furthermore, the case interviews have been 
conducted for a more comprehensive subproject of Chinese FDI in the Baltic Sea Region. 
Thus, the questions and answers that are relevant to this study are picked out from the 
interview database, and analyzed and reported separately from the multi-method research 
on the basis of the theoretical framework introduced earlier. 
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Finally, there are some practical reasons in the research object to choose the particular 
method, a multi-case research. Firstly, the number of the realized Chinese FDI in the 
target countries of the study is too small for conducting a quantitative research reliable 
enough. Secondly, the phenomenon of the Chinese FDI is new, and there is relatively 
little information about motives and factors behind the location decisions especially in 
small developed economies, such as Finland and Sweden. Thus only using a qualitative 
research method enables to gain profound knowledge of the research problem. In addition, 
in order to draw a clear and generalizable picture of the phenomenon in the target region, 
also several other stakeholders, such as partner companies of the Chinese MNE and 
representatives of expert organizations were interviewed in Finland, Sweden and China. 
 
3.2 Data collection and study design 
 
As mentioned earlier, the strength of a case study is opportunity to use multiple sources 
of evidence which is called triangulation (Thiétart et al. 2001, 82; Yin 2003, 86 & 97). 
Also in this study, three kinds of data are collected – documentation, archival records and 
interviews (Yin 2003, 85-89). General picture of the phenomenon is drawn by using a 
desk study method, i.e. sources are news articles, websites, statistical publications, 
surveys, the media reports of the companies and organizations involved in the 
phenomenon etc. Another part of the study is conducted using a field work research 
method. In this part 38 semi-structured and open-ended theme interviews (Yin 2003, 90) 
were made in Finland (32 interviews), Sweden (4) and China (2) between December 
2008 and October 2010. The time-span when the actual cases have been occurred is from 
the mid-1990 to present day. The interviews were either recorded and transcribed or 
careful notes were made in cases when the interviewee did not allow recording or felt 
uncomfortable with it. This followed Yin‟s (2003, 92) recommendations for a tape 
recording of interviews. Altogether 22 interviews were recorded, but from 18 interviews 
with the Chinese interviewees only 6 were recorded. This may be due to the unfamiliarity 
and mistrust of the Chinese towards academic study interviews, as well as due to the old 
wisdom “do not disclose your situation to the outsiders” in Sunzi‟s famous text „Art of 
War‟ which is well-known and used to provide strategic views among the Chinese 
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businessmen (Sunzi 2005, 88-91). Therefore, which was essential in this study with 
respondents from the Chinese companies, fully anonymity was provided for the 
interviewees in order to achieve as high reliability of the results as possible. Most of the 
interviews were face-to-face discussions, three were made by telephone. The interview 
languages were Finnish, Chinese and English, and the interview situations were designed 
so that at least one native Finnish or Chinese interviewer was present in the interviews 
where those languages were used. English was used to seven interviews when the 
interviewer and interviewee did not have the same native language. The author 
participated in 30 interviews. Finally, every interview transcriptions and notes were 
encoded with NVivo software that is developed for a qualitative data analysis according 
to their themes. In this way, data was easy to handle in the analyzing phase of the study. 
 
The respondents were representatives of the Chinese companies operating in Finland, the 
local partners of the Chinese companies, and expert or investment promoting 
organizations of Finland, Sweden and China. The interviewees represent 28 companies 
and organizations: eleven Chinese companies, six partner companies and organizations 
(Finnish, Swedish or international), four commercial chambers/investment promotion 
offices (Finnish, Swedish and Chinese), and seven other organizations of expertise, 
including two ministries and one university. Of the interviewed people, 17 were Finnish, 
18 Chinese and 3 Swedish (Table 4). Two Chinese persons were interviewed twice 
during the research process due to the novelty of their operations in Finland and in China 
in time of the first interview. The number of Swedish respondents is small but also other 
respondents were interviewed about their experiences of Sweden if they had any. In the 
interviews was found out that several respondents had first-hand information about 
investments in Sweden as they had been operating also there besides Finland. The 
interview form was the same also for Swedish respondents, Finland had just replaced by 
Sweden in the questions. 
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Table 4. Number of interviewed persons classified by nationality and type of 
company/organization. 
                                         Nationality
Type of organization
Chinese companies 3 11 0 14
Commercial chambers /
Investment promotion offices
Partner companies /organizations 4 1 2 7
Other expert organizations 7 1 0 8
Total 17 18 3 38
Finnish Chinese Swedish Total
3 5 1 9
 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study is part of wider research of the Chinese FDI in the Baltic 
Sea region and the original interview form (Appendix 1) contained also other questions 
concerning issues outside of the focus of this study. The form was divided into seven 
themes: „background information‟ (of company and investment), „general information 
about the target country or region‟, „relationship with the public sector‟, „relationship 
with the local partner company‟ (if any), „relationship with the companies and market‟, 
„employees‟ and „future‟. The core questions for this study were under themes „general 
information about the target country or region‟ and „relationship with the companies and 
market‟. The most of questions under the first theme were design to find out why Finland 
was chosen for the host country for the particular FDI and to compare Finland and its 
neighbouring countries as hosts for FDI. These are essential to answer the second and 
third research questions. Under another theme the core question was “what was the main 
motive to invest in Finland?” which refers straightly to the first research question. 
However, also many other theme area questions in the question form are important for 
this study because they shed light on the important background information about the 
Chinese FDI phenomenon and the reasons to invest in Finland. For example, the role of 
the public sector behind the FDI decisions is essential to know, especially in the case of 
the Chinese investments as was discussed in the literature review. 
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3.3 Discussion of the validity and reliability of the study 
 
Validity and reliability of data collection and study design are usually more difficult to 
verify in a qualitative case study than in a quantitative study and therefore it should be 
prepared and presented with care. However, according to Yin (2003, 33-39) the validity 
and reliability of a qualitative case study can be measured using certain logical means and 
he introduces four tests to evaluate the validity and reliability of the case study.  These 
are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Test of internal 
validity can be used only in explanatory and causal studies, so it is not discussed in detail 
here. In general, validity refers to the ability of the utilized measurements to indicate 
correctly the researched phenomenon. 
 
Construct validity refers to the establishment of the correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied. It is particularly hard to attest in a qualitative case study research, 
as there are often suspicions that the researcher‟s operational set of measures are not 
sufficient and subjective judgments have been used in the data collecting (Yin 2003, 35). 
Furthermore, the interviewees usually have their personal perspectives and opinions 
about the events and the phenomenon that might be contradictory and not always very 
objective (Korhonen 2005, 164). Thus, the requirements for the objectivity could not 
have been particularly strict in this study, but the aim of it has been to collect as extensive 
data as possible by using multiple sources of evidence: documentation, archival records 
and 39 interviews. In this way it has been possible to gain a wide view over the 
phenomenon and often repeated views by different respondents, and thus the construct 
validity of the study has been increased. 
 
External validity refers to the generalizability of the findings of a study. Once again, also 
this kind of validity is problematic in case studies, especially if it is a single-case study. 
However, a comparison of external validity between survey and case researches is tricky 
because survey studies use statistical generalization whereas case studies rely on 
analytical generalization. The latter means that the researcher is striving to generalize a 
particular set of results to broader theory (Yin 2003, 37). Still, generalizability often 
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requires that the theory is to be tested by repeating the study and collecting the findings 
also from other similar groups of respondents and observe if the similar results recur. In 
this study, the external validity is enhanced by interviewing a large proportion of the 
Chinese companies that have already invested in Finland - eleven of approximately 20 
Chinese companies in Finland - and using Sweden as a benchmark for Finland. This way 
a fairly extensive overview of the Chinese companies' views related to the investment 
motives and FDI location factors has been managed to compile, and to compare the 
results with another rather similar small developed economy. 
 
Finally, reliability means that operations of a study are able to be repeated with the same 
results, i.e. if someone follows the same procedures as described by the original 
researcher the same results should be occur. Thus the aim is to minimize the errors and 
biases in a study (Yin 2003, 37-38). Ensuring high reliability is possible only with careful 
documentation of the procedures used in a study that the readers can easily follow, e.g. by 
developing a case study database. In this study, the database is created as the 
documentation and archival records are collected from public sources and interviews 
have been encoded into the themes which have been discussed in the phrasing of the 
research questions of this study. However, as mentioned earlier, the respondents have 
been interviewed with full anonymity for improving the reliability of the study. Thus, the 
raw material of the interviews cannot be investigated by others than the author and the 
research team in CEMAT.  
 
The empirical findings of this study are discussed in the following chapter and it is 
structured as follows. First, the Chinese FDI activities globally are briefly described and 
then focusing in small developed countries, especially in Finland and Sweden. Second, 
the motives and location factors of the Chinese FDI in Finland are discussed as they 
appeared in the interviews of this study. Lastly, the comparison of the motives and 
location factors of the Chinese FDI has been made between Finland and Sweden. 
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4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
As in the introduction chapter was sketched, the economic rise of China has been 
incredibly fast since the late 1970s onwards. Mainly because of the rapid rise and the 
centralism of the country, there are some specific features in the FDI activity of the 
Chinese that are presented in the chapter of literature review. Therefore, before 
introducing the Chinese FDI activities in the small developed economies and the findings 
from the case-study, it is necessary to have an overview of the Chinese FDI field in 
general. 
 
4.1 Overview of the Chinese FDI 
 
As in the previous chapters was mentioned, the investment activities of China have been 
widely directed by the government and the outward foreign investment have been 
exempted from the control gradually since the late 1970s from the "Open Door" policy. 
FDI of China began to grow particularly in the 1990s after Deng Xiaoping‟s southern 
tour of China that initiated to reassert the economic reforms. First grew the inward FDI 
and later also outward FDI have surged, especially since 1999 when the government-
led ‟Go Global‟ policy (in Chinese zou chu qu) was enforced. It provided a strong public 
support for an institutional environment that enhances outward investment to be absorbed 
by various governmental actors, and the Chinese government formalized the policy on its 
10
th
 five-year plan in 2001 (Buckley et al. 2008b). The WTO membership in 2001 
facilitated the activities of foreign companies further in China and competition in their 
domestic market intensified for Chinese enterprises. This forced more Chinese companies, 
particularly the private ones that lack of domestic political protection, to seek new 
markets and competitive improvements overseas. 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the approval system has been further unburden and 
decentralised to sub-national government authorities. The authorities are also moving a 
pre-investment approval procedure to a post-investment registration system. Foreign 
investments of private Chinese companies were finally fully allowed in 2003 (Buckley et 
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al. 2007). However, although Chinese private companies surpass SOEs by the volume 
and technological level of export goods, while SOEs are chiefly concentrated on the 
export of commodity products as steel, the field of outward FDI has still been dominated 
by SOEs (Studwell 2009). Until 2009, SOEs had accounted almost 70% of monetary 
value of non-financial Chinese FDI although their share of total amount of the Chinese 
FDI has been only around 5%. Also, every of top-10 companies by outward FDI stock 
and foreign assets are either directly state-owned companies or listed enterprises largely 
owned and controlled by the Chinese government. The largest foreign assets of privately-
held companies are possessed by Huawei Technologies and Legend Holdings (Lenovo) 
(MOFCOM 2010). Government‟s strong role in the Chinese outward FDI has been 
explained by the fact that despite the liberalization began since the 1980s the SOEs still 
have an important role in the industrial sector and because the economy of China is 
export-driven the SOEs have begun to promote their exports and to secure access to raw 
materials from abroad (Athreye & Kapur 2009). 
 
4.1.1 General position of the Chinese FDI 
 
As usual in case of Asian and developing countries, also the Chinese FDI are still mainly 
intra-regional within East and Southeast Asia. Even nearly 68% of total flow of the 
Chinese FDI went either to Hong Kong or to ASEAN countries in 2009 (MOFCOM 
2010). This is largely so because the firm-specific advantages of the Chinese companies 
are best suited to the surrounding regions and the networks of the ethnic Chinese have 
generated a lot of cross-border business operations within and outward from East and 
Southeast Asia since the companies of the overseas ethnic Chinese have strongly 
internationalized (UNCTAD 2006, 117 & 127; Buckley et al 2007; Rugman & Doh 2008, 
178 & 198). Besides, very few Chinese companies are truly global or even 
internationalized as a clear majority, even 95%, of the sales of the large Chinese 
companies are still generated domestically, even though they have made substantial FDI 
at the same time (Rugman 2008, 96). 
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So far, most FDI have been made by three types of Chinese companies: large SOEs 
which mostly operate in the field of natural resources, medium-sized companies in 
mature industries such as light and heavy manufacture as well as electrical home 
appliances which have overcapacity at the home market (Deng 2009). According to 
Zhang (2009), the natural resources oriented FDI are made especially in the Middle East, 
Central Asia, Africa and Australia, manufacturing FDI in Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, and FDI of services, including marketing and trade- and export-
supporting, in Hong Kong, Northern America and Western Europe.  
 
According to MOFCOM (2010), in 2009 85% of flow and 81% of stock of Chinese FDI 
was non-financial and the rest was financial FDI (banking, insurance, securities etc.). By 
the end of 2009 almost 12,000 Chinese investing entities had established over 13,000 
overseas enterprises in 177 countries and regions employing almost one million 
employees, including 438,000 foreigners. The Chinese government has spurred the state-
owned and private companies to diversify geographically their overseas production 
portfolio and thus decrease of political and other risks (Buckley et al. 2008). 
 
In 2009, regarding the stock of Chinese investments the ten largest FDI destination 
regions and countries had been Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, 
Australia, Singapore, South Africa, the USA, Luxembourg, Russia and Macau. The same 
countries appear on the top of the list of Chinese FDI flow in 2009, but also Canada and 
Myanmar have reached the top-10 (Table 5) (MOFCOM 2010). If EU and ASEAN were 
counted as single entities, they would be the third and fourth biggest FDI flow, and the 
fourth and third biggest FDI stock destination, respectively. Hong Kong, the Cayman 
Islands and the British Virgin Islands often serve as intermediaries to forward Chinese 
investments to other destinations or back to China as “round-trip” investments. Hong 
Kong has this status because the Chinese companies are less restricted to invest first into 
Hong Kong (within „one country, two systems‟ context) and then freely to other 
destinations from there, which is a much easier way to utilize FDI than directly from the 
mainland China to abroad. In the latter two companies enjoy benefits from their tax-free 
and offshore banking systems. So far there is no reliable statistical means to estimate 
where to and how much Chinese investments have been directed via these „mediator 
68 
 
destinations‟ but Hess (2006) assumes that around 25-40% of all the Chinese investments 
have been round-tripping ones. 
 
Table 5. Ten largest host countries/regions of the Chinese FDI flow and stock in 
2009, including EU. 
 
Source: MOFCOM 2010. 
 
It is instructive to note that several countries are both within the largest destinations of the 
Chinese outward FDI and also the largest investors into China (Appendix 2). Hong Kong 
dominated both top-10 lists of FDI flow in 2009 since it counted 59% of the total inward 
FDI to China and 63% of the total outward FDI from China. Other countries that appear 
in both top-10 lists are Singapore, the USA, Macau and Canada, as well as EU and 
ASEAN as single entities. Also the list of the largest foreign trade partners with China 
correlates moderately well with the main destinations of the Chinese outward FDI. Thus 
there are empirical evidences that trade and FDI volumes are relatively closely correlated 
also in the case of China. However, large Eastern and Southern Asian countries, such as 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India, have been important trade partners but less 
important as outward FDI destinations for China. Also in Europe, China has been clearly 
more active in trade than investing operations, excluding Luxembourg which can be 
considered as a distinct case from other larger European countries. The lists of the ten 
largest investing countries into China as well as export & import partners are in Appendix 
3 (China Custom Statistics 2010, Invest in China 2010, MOFCOM 2010). If the top-list 
of the Chinese FDI host countries is compared with the largest FDI destinations globally, 
Pos. Country Million USD Pos. Country Million USD
1 Hong Kong 35 601 1 Hong Kong 164 499
2 Cayman Islands 5 366 2 British Virgin Islands 15 061
3 Australia 2 436 3 Cayman Islands 13 577
4 Luxembourg 2 270 4 Australia 5 863
5 British Virgin Islands 1 612 5 Singapore 4 857
6 Singapore 1 414 6 South Africa 2 307
7 USA 909 7 USA 3 338
8 Canada 613 8 Luxembourg 2 484
9 Macau 456 9 Russia 2 220
10 Myanmar 377 10 Macau 1 837
EU 2 966 EU 6 278
Others 4 779 Others 25 918
Total 56 529 Total 245 755
FDI flow in 2009 FDI stock in 2009
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the difference is still relatively big. Globally, the main proportion of the FDI is still 
flowing to the Western developed countries although also Hong Kong enjoys a strong 
position globally, which nowadays is largely explained by the FDI from mainland China. 
The ten largest FDI host countries globally are illustrated by their flow and stock in 2009 
in Appendix 4. 
 
In China, the largest outward non-financial investment sources have been the province of 
Guangdong – particularly the city of Shenzhen – Beijing and Shanghai, as well as the 
provinces of Zhejiang, Shandong and Jiangsu in the eastern coast of China. In addition to 
these richest regions of China, also FDI from Liaoning – particularly the city of Dalian – 
and Hunan provinces increased rapidly in 2009. Nevertheless, FDI of the large SOEs that 
are approved by the central government are not included in these statistics (MOFCOM 
2010). Again, these regions are also the most active in the foreign trade and largest 
destinations of inward FDI in China. 
 
When it comes to the Chinese FDI by a sector, in 2009 the Chinese made overseas FDI 
particularly in leasing & business services (36.2% of total outward FDI), mining (23.6%), 
finance (15.5%) and wholesale & retailing (10.9%) sectors counted by monetary value 
(MOFCOM 2010). Regarding the stock of the Chinese FDI, the largest sectors are the 
same but finance comes before mining (Table 6). FDI had increased the most in mining, 
real estate as well as science research, services & geo-survey sectors from previous year, 
whereas the FDI especially in finance decreased substantially. However, most of FDI by 
a number was made in wholesale & retailing (36.6%), manufacturing (31.9%), 
construction (4.5%), leasing & business service (3.9%), mining (3.5%) and primary 
production (3.4%) sectors. It is notable that manufacturing sector has been clearly more 
important for inward FDI to China than for the Chinese outward FDI. Finally, Davies 
(2010) points out that there will be likely major shifts in the sectoral composition of the 
Chinese FDI in the upcoming years. FDI in leasing & business services might have been 
initially undertaken for supporting China‟s rapid growth in merchandise trade, but Davies 
inaugurates that the Chinese companies may diversify toward the manufacturing sector to 
service the markets of their global consumer goods more directly in the future. 
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Table 6. Chinese FDI flow and stock by sector in 2009 (million USD). 
 
Source: MOFCOM 2010. 
 
Leasing & business services, finance and wholesale & retailing sectors are dominating 
the Chinese FDI in Hong Kong which explains their standing at the top of the sector list 
of Chinese overseas investment. Chinese state-owned commercial banks have shown a 
growing activity abroad and they are extended their services in host countries to support 
non-financial investments from China. By the end of 2009, the Chinese state-owned 
commercial banks had established 50 branch offices and 18 affiliated institutions in 28 
countries or regions. Meanwhile, China had established 12 financial institutions in the 
insurance sector abroad. (MOFCOM 2010) 
 
Finally, it is important to note that evidently the official Chinese statistics are not 
completely transparent and definitions are not necessarily equivalent with international 
standards. Figures of Chinese outward FDI vary between the statistics of UNCTAD and 
those of Chinese MOFCOM and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). An 
example of the figure differences between UNCTAD and MOFCOM was given in 
Chapter 1.1. Figures of MOFCOM and SAFE vary because SAFE records FDI from the 
reporting system of the national balance of payments. Thus it captures e.g. the large 
investments of the Chinese financial institutions and the SOEs approved by State Council 
as well as capital fund transfers by the Chinese parent firms to foreign affiliates, which 
are not registered as FDI by MOFCOM. Besides, as discussed earlier, the Chinese FDI 
data includes round-tripping investment flows to Hong Kong and the tax havens, which 
will be later reinvested back to China in order to exploit a beneficial treatment of foreign 
Sector Flow Share-% Stock Share-%
Leasing & business services 20 474 36,2 72 949 29,7
Mining 13 343 23,6 40 580 16,5
Finance 8 734 15,5 45 994 18,7
Wholesale & retailing 6 136 10,9 35 695 14,5
Manufacturing 2 241 4,0 13 592 5,5
Transport, warehousing & postal services 2 068 3,7 16 631 6,8
Real estate 938 1,7 5 343 2,2
Science research, services & geo-survey 776 1,4 2 874 1,2
Others 1 819 3,2 12 097 4,9
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investments in China (Gugler & Boie, 2008; Buckley et al 2008). It is highly important to 
pay attention to this possible statistical distortion because Hong Kong, the British Virgin 
Islands and the Cayman Islands together counted even 80% of the Chinese FDI stock 
until 2008, although certainly not all the Chinese FDI have been round-tripping ones in 
these destinations but also directed to other countries that Mainland China. 
 
4.1.2 Chinese FDI in small developed economies 
 
When compared the Chinese FDI in different small developed economies the amounts are 
very polarized and focused on certain countries. As mentioned earlier, the vast majority 
of the Mainland Chinese FDI is directed to Hong Kong. In addition, ethnically Chinese 
Singapore as well as geographically large and resource-rich Australia and Canada have 
received and are still receiving a significant amount of the Chinese FDI. However, the 
majority of small developed economies, such as Finland, have received the Chinese FDI 
worth only a few million dollars, and those figures are at approximately the same level 
with the less developed economies with a similar size in Europe and other continents. The 
values of the Chinese FDI in the small developed economies (defined in Chapter 1.4) in 
2009 are illustrated in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Value of the Chinese FDI in the small developed economies in 2009 (million 
USD). 
  
Source: MOFCOM 2010. 
 
When comparing the Chinese FDI and FDI generally made in the small developed 
economies, the order is quite same but the differences between the economies are larger. 
For instance, the global position of FDI in Hong Kong, Canada and the Netherlands is 
high, as one can notice in Appendix 5. On the other hand, e.g. Belgium and Switzerland 
have attracted the Chinese investors significantly less that could be expected of their 
global inward FDI position. Still, if the Chinese FDI and foreign trade from China are 
compared with each other in the small developed economies, the results correlate with 
each other quite well. China both invests in and trades the most with Hong Kong, 
followed by Australia, Singapore and the Netherlands. However, it has to be noted that 
some countries, such as Finland, have received only a few Chinese FDI despite the fact 
that its trade with China has been quite extensive. (Table 8) 
 
  
Country Inflow Stock
Australia 2 436,4 5 864,1
Austria  - 1,6
Belgium 23,6 56,9
Canada 613,1 1 670,3
Denmark 2,6 40,8
Finland 1,1 9,0
Greece  - 1,7
Hong Kong 35 600,6 164 498,9
Ireland -1,0 106,8
Israel  - 11,4
The Netherlands 101,5 335,9
New Zealand 9,0 93,9
Norway 3,6 13,0
Portugal  - 5,0
Singapore 1 414,3 4 857,3
Sweden 8,1 111,9
Switzerland 21,0 30,3
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Table 8. Foreign trade between China and the small developed economies in 2009 
(billion USD). 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010  
 
According to MOFCOM statistics (2010), the Chinese made remarkable FDI especially 
in business services, finance, wholesale & retailing and electronics in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, in business services and manufacturing in the Netherlands, in business 
services in Ireland, in wholesale & retailing in Sweden, as well as in mining in Australia. 
 
When it comes to the particular focus countries of this study, Finland and Sweden, the 
difference between these two countries is relatively large. By 2009, Sweden had received 
the Chinese FDI worth more than 12-fold compared with Finland although the gap 
narrowed considerably from the previous year (Table 9). If compared with other small 
developed countries in the region, Sweden has received clearly most both the Chinese 
FDI and FDI generally and it seems to be the base of business establishment for many 
foreign MNEs in northern Europe, while Finland has managed to attract far less foreign 
investment than its neighbouring developed countries. Nevertheless, the Chinese FDI 
activity in Sweden is a fairly new phenomenon as well and actually it did not begin 
earlier than in the mid-2000s. In this respect it seems that Finland is about five years 
behind Sweden in the development of the inward Chinese FDI. 
Country Exports Imports Total
Australia 22,2 37,4 59,7
Austria 1,8 3,1 4,9
Belgium 14,9 5,3 20,2
Canada 21,8 12,7 34,5
Denmark 5,6 2,6 8,2
Finland 7,3 3,5 10,9
Greece 4,1 0,2 4,3
Hong Kong 190,7 12,9 203,6
Ireland 4,3 2,7 7,1
Israel 4,3 1,8 6,0
The Netherlands 45,9 5,3 51,2
New Zealand 2,5 1,9 4,4
Norway 2,6 2,1 4,7
Portugal 2,3 0,4 2,7
Singapore 32,3 20,2 52,5
Sweden 5,1 5,0 10,2
Switzerland 3,9 7,4 11,3
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Table 9. Chinese FDI flow and stock in Finland and Sweden in 2003-2009 (million 
USD). 
 
Source: MOFCOM 2010. 
 
In addition, Sweden is clearly ahead of Finland in the number of individual Chinese 
investments. While hardly 20 Chinese FDI have been realized in Finland (if the Chinese 
restaurants are not included), Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA) reported already in 
September 2009 that it has helped almost 190 investments from 160 Chinese enterprises 
since it established mainland China headquarters in Shanghai in 2002. Moreover, ISA 
estimates that it supports approximately 25-35 Chinese investors to invest in Sweden 
annually (China International Fair for Investment & Trade 2009). ISA's arrival in China 
occurred in the same period when the Chinese FDI in Sweden began to increase rapidly, 
which unlikely is a coincidence. However, the profile of the Chinese FDI is rather alike in 
both countries. The investments are concentrated mainly in the sectors of trading & 
importing and IT, electronics, software & computers. For instance, Chinese ICT giants 
ZTE and Huawei have invested both in Sweden and in Finland, but Sweden has received 
a more diverse set of Chinese investments as there have been several Chinese FDI also in 
the fields of tourism & aviation, logistics & shipping, metal & forestry industries as well 
as in service industries (ISA 2010b). In addition, many Chinese provinces have opened 
their representation offices in Sweden. These include, for instance, Shanghai‟s office in 
Gothenburg, Changxing‟s office from Zhejiang province and Wuxi‟s office from Jiangsu 
province in Kalmar as well as Henan‟s office in Gävle. 
 
In Finland, the earliest Chinese companies were established already in the mid-1990s, 
when e.g. one of the largest shipping companies in the world, state-owned China Ocean 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Finland  -  -  -  - 0,01 2,66 1,11
Sweden 0,17 2,64 1,00 5,30 68,06 10,66 8,10
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Finland  -  - 0,90 0,93 0,94 3,59 9,04
Sweden 6,07 6,44 22,46 20,02 146,93 157,59 111,89
Flow
Stock
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Shipping Company (COSCO), established a joint venture Cosfim Oy with John 
Nurminen Oy. Also Air China has had a presence in Finland already for several years. 
However, most of the current investments have been done within the last few years and 
they have been either greenfield FDI or acquisitions. With few exceptions, the FDI have 
been made by private Chinese companies although the largest of them receive domestic 
government support in their foreign operations as already mentioned in the earlier 
chapters.  
 
The number of Chinese companies in Finland is still small, but it has increased quickly 
particularly since 2008 and the same trend will apparently continue for the next few years. 
According to the Economic and Commercial Councellor‟s Office of the Embassy of P.R. 
China, there are some 5-6 Chinese companies which are about to invest in Finland within 
the next couple of years. In June 2009 the governments of Finland and China signed an 
agreement to establish China-Finland innovation platform in the Helsinki Capital region 
in order to support the Chinese R&D-intensive companies to establish their operations 
and cooperation with the local companies in Finland and Europe (GHP 2009). Later on 
the platform has become concrete by opening two premises, one in Espoo, Finland, and 
one in Shanghai. Furthermore, the city of Vantaa is about to open a Finnish-Chinese 
cooperation center in the Aviapolis area, near Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (City of Vantaa 
2008). Currently, Vantaa is looking for some 20-30 Chinese companies to verify their 
entrance on the center before it is ready to notify the opening of the center. The China 
Development Bank (CDB) is contracted to be one financer for the Chinese companies, 
and the bank nibbles at financing also Finnish companies and infrastructure projects in 
Finland. CDB plans to open an office in the Helsinki capital region in the near future. 
Economic & Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Chinese Embassy has supported 
some smaller companies‟ FDI with small amounts and helped with immigration 
procedures. According to interviews for this study, the larger companies have not 
received monetary support from the Chinese government.  
 
Furthermore, a couple of acquisitions of Finnish companies have been made by the 
Chinese MNEs during very recent years. For instance, in August 2009 Chinese Neusoft 
acquired a mobile phone software development and test unit of Sesca Group (as well as 
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its branch in Romania) which organization was under rearrangement, and in late 2010 a 
Chinese medicine company Naton bought a biotechnology company Inion which had 
been in liquidation before the acquisition. In the near future, the number of the Chinese 
hi-tech investments in Finland is expected to grow by a new Sino-Finnish innovation 
center Golden Bridge. It is a service platform for the Chinese hi-tech companies willing 
to invest in R&D activities and in market expansion through Finland to access European 
and Russian markets (Golden Bridge 2011). Golden Bridge is a reciprocal project for 
Finnish Innovation Center FinChi in Shanghai and Shenzhen has also been strongly 
involved in the project development. Another Chinese city has been active in Finland, as 
Wuxi opened an office of Wuxi Oversea Station in Tampere in August 2010. In sum, the 
number of Chinese investments is this low but the penetration speed of new FDI is 
quickening, likewise in Sweden some 5-6 years earlier.  
 
On the other hand, Sweden has received approximately 200 Chinese investments by more 
than 150 Chinese companies. Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA) listed 71 Chinese 
investments that have been made in cooperation with ISA since 2001 and were still active 
in 2008. ISA has invested a lot in China and it has three representative offices in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. Many of the Chinese FDI have been made in Stockholm and 
Gothenburg regions and southern Sweden, particularly in Kalmar, although Kalmar‟s 
China Center (Fanerdun Group) changed its owner after a stoppage of its operations since 
problems and a dispute between the initial investor and the Chinese authorities. 
Obviously, the Chinese government did not accept the capital transfer to Sweden because 
of a fear of bad news headlines about suspicious FDI in Kalmar. The project had also 
controversies with the Swedish government over the minimum wage level of the 
construction workers in the centre. However, the Kalmar‟s case gained a lot of publicity 
in China and may generate more Chinese interest toward Sweden in the future. Chinese 
ICT giants Huawei and ZTE have R&D sites in Kista science city, near to Stockholm. 
The vast majority of the Chinese investments have been greenfield or acquisition types 
but also some strategic alliances have been created between Chinese and Swedish 
partners. So far, the most famous Chinese acquisition in Sweden occurred in 2010 when a 
Chinese car manufacturer Geely Automobile bought the passenger car division of Volvo. 
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The following three chapters consist mainly of the results of the interview material. The 
external information from the interviews has been marked with the source references. 
 
4.2 Motives of the Chinese FDI in Finland 
 
If the Chinese FDI in Finland are classified according to Dunning‟s taxonomy of FDI 
motives, the investments are concentrated on the categories of market, efficiency and 
strategic asset seeking motives. Chinese resource seeking investments have not realized 
yet although there are prospects for them.   
 
4.2.1 Resource seeking investments 
 
Resource seeking motives have not prompted the Chinese to invest in Finland, although 
especially the Chinese state-owned natural resource companies appear to be rather 
interested in the Finnish mines and natural resources. Yet, there has been very little to 
buy in the sector while most of the mines are already in foreign ownership. Apparently 
there has been only one Chinese investment in that sector in Finland, the fourth largest 
nickel producer in the world, Jinchuan Group, purchased a share of Finnish Nickel Ltd 
owned by Canadian Belvedere Resources Ltd. One term of the deal was that the Chinese 
part is able to buy nickel at certain contract price. The situation may change with new 
more efficient enrichment technologies that both increase the value of the existing mines 
(i.e. possibly raise the price offered by the Chinese) and open up opportunities to 
establish new mines. Anyhow, the exploitability of the mines is still in the study phase. 
Another basic resource, cheap labour, is non-existent in Finland so the Chinese have not 
set up manufacturing in Finland that would be based on the resource seeking motives. All 
the interviewees had a consistent opinion of this. 
 
4.2.2 Market seeking investments 
 
78 
 
Most of the Chinese FDI positioned in Finland have had market seeking motives, one 
way or another. Some small family-owned companies have come to Finland mainly to 
sell China made products at competitive prices. Originally, some of these types of 
companies were planning to store and sell their products from Finland to the Chinese 
dealers that are operating in Russia and make large orders. Nonetheless, the labile border 
formalities of Russia have made this kind of business unprofitable. The Finnish market 
has proved to be fairly small for retailing by the family businesses and they have neither 
managed to create supplier relationships with the large Finnish retail chains because those 
already have their own supply networks in Asia. Thus the future of the small Chinese 
family businesses does not look too bright in Finland, unless they have specific niche 
products to offer. On the other hand, one Chinese interviewee told that the competition is 
very intense between family business retailers in the larger European countries (e.g. in 
Italy) where there are thousands of Chinese retail enterprises and wholesale centers. 
According to a Finnish investment expert, small Chinese family business investments 
abroad, e.g. in Finland, are part of a very long-term strategy for the future to strengthen 
the international network of the family and to seek „bridgeheads‟ in the developed 
countries, where the family and its business has possibility to grow. However, one 
Finnish China specialist thinks that there is not a suitable business environment and 
enough large Chinese population in Finland so that family businesses of this kind could 
thrive and multiply on a large scale. 
 
In the case of larger companies, Nokia and many companies in the ICT cluster grown 
around Nokia are important customers for the Chinese companies and these customer 
relationships have usually been formed initially in China. According to the interviews, 
Nokia has been the biggest single reason for Chinese investments in Finland. Presence in 
the Nokia-led cluster or in the immediacy of it is both market and strategic asset seeking 
FDI, as customerships in ICT production chains are global and long-lasting. ICT software 
development requires close relationships with the client companies from design and co-
creation phases up to after-sales services, which forces the Chinese companies to be 
physically present in Finland and possess some Finnish personnel with direct contacts 
with the client (usually Nokia) as well as knowledge of the local language and culture. In 
the ICT sector, the trend is currently moving in the direction where the sub-contractors 
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with ability to provide total packages - not only one or some components or services - to 
their clients are favored. Because of this, also the larger Chinese companies have been 
forced to acquire the missing pieces of the value chain in order to remain the preferred 
supplier of their main clients. Consequently, there have been acquisitions of ICT 
companies also in Finland made by the Chinese, and they are very likely to continue also 
in the future. The targets are typically smaller and/or economically weak sub-contractors 
or parts of a larger corporation of which the parent company wants to get rid of. 
According to a Chinese investment specialist, similar acquisitions are expected also in the 
sectors of health care, cleantech and biomedicine.  
 
Again, some Chinese companies have come to Finland because of the difficult market 
and intense competition, or in order to exploit their competitive domestic brand. In 
mobile operator business Finland was the first country which implemented so called 
„number portability‟ meaning that customer is able to preserve his/her phone number 
despite the changing of the operator. Because this is the global trend nowadays, the 
Chinese mobile companies wanted to come to Finland to learn how to cope and survive in 
labile and low-margin markets. Furthermore, almost every of global mobile operators are 
in the Western European market, which includes also Finland. The market represents 25% 
of the global mobile operator market, so a business establishment there is important both 
in terms of the sales and the global strategy of the company if it wants to be a large global 
player in the industry. Renown of the brand has been exploited by, for instance, ZTE, 
whose products are sold by Elisa/Saunalahti together with subscriber connections, as well 
as Huawei, whose mobile modems are sold together with Sonera‟s broadband subscriber. 
   
Most of the market seeking investments has been made to serve a geographically larger 
market area than the just Finland. Only a few companies in the service sector, e.g. in 
health services, have invested only in the domestic markets of Finland, because of the 
nature of their products and fairly high purchasing power level of the private Finnish 
people. As mentioned above, many Chinese enterprises especially in the ICT sector are 
looking for clients from higher in the value chains than they used to do earlier. Those 
clients usually operate globally, just as Nokia. On the other hand, the Chinese companies 
might follow their Chinese global clients, such as Huawei, to Finland, like the Finnish 
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suppliers followed Nokia to China a decade earlier. For this reason, their investments in 
Finland are, in fact, investments for the global markets.  
 
Furthermore, the Chinese investments in Finland often serve, besides Finland, also the 
markets of the Baltic countries, one company‟s office even Belarus, but also the Nordic 
countries in some extend as well as Western European markets in general. Particular 
Nordic headquarters the Chinese MNEs have not in Finland but they have been based 
mainly in Sweden or Denmark thus far. Most Chinese MNEs does not have their Nordic 
headquarters at all because their business in the region is so small-scale that there is no 
need for regional hierarchy levels. Russia is very seldom covered by the FDI in Finland 
which is somewhat surprising, but the finding is rather similar to the finding in the survey 
about American MNEs in Finland made by Deloitte in 2006. The importance of 
proximity to Russia did hardly emerge in the opinions of the American MNEs and the 
result is the same with the Chinese MNEs in Finland.  
 
One interviewed Chinese branch office did earlier cover the Baltic countries, northwest 
Russia and Belarus, but the sales to Russia was dropped from the duties of the office in 
Finland by the establishing a representative in Saint Petersburg. The Chinese 
interviewees felt the boundary between Finland and Russia to be difficult and therefore 
have not considered it worthwhile to invest in Finland for serving also the Russian market. 
On the other hand, if the Trans-Siberian railway from China through Russia to Finland 
would begin to be competitive both in price- and schedule-wise, Finland would be 
logistically an interesting investment destination for warehousing and distributing the 
Chinese goods for the North-West Russian market. Anyhow, the current low reliability of 
the railway line does not suggest that it would be a potential transportation route, at least 
in the near future. According to one Finnish investment expert, the Chinese do not invest 
in Finland for the close Russian markets if they have a distinct strategy for Russia. China 
is also a neighbor of Russia and the Chinese are accustomed to do business with the 
Russians. In smaller scale logistic operations Finland would be a viable investment 
destination for Chinese companies, if the border to Russia worked better. Currently, the 
project of „Baltic Pearl‟ (real estate, social services as well as hotel and trade center) 
(Barauskaite 2009) which is under construction and funded as well owned by the Chinese 
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investors, might increase the demand for logistic and retail services also from Finland in 
the future. This might tempt the Chinese to make market seeking FDI also to the Finnish 
side of the border. In addition, the Russian market for the construction materials has 
attracted the Chinese, for example, to export steel through Finland to Russia. An example 
of this was the plan to set up a joint sales company in Finland by Finnish Steelteam and 
Chinese Shougangin (Capital Steel). The joint venture would have sold the Chinese steel 
further to Russian and European markets (Steelteam 2009). However, the plan did not 
materialize but it displays the interest of the Chinese toward FDI in the commodity 
markets located in Finland. 
 
4.2.3 Efficiency seeking investments 
 
Similarly as in the other Western countries, the Chinese have made very few efficient 
seeking FDI in Finland, largely due to the small number of Chinese investment as a 
whole. The only case that rose from the interviews was a logistics company which 
invested in Finland in order to strengthen its global service network. The main reason to 
invest in Finland was the export traffic of the Finnish forest industry. However, the 
Finnish representative of the company suspected that in the future the company may 
terminate its office in Finland and centralize all its operations of the Nordic countries into 
Denmark where it has the branch office for Scandinavia. This arrangement would also 
have the efficiency seeking motives. 
 
4.2.4 Strategic asset seeking 
 
Besides the market seeking, the strategic asset seeking motives have been clearly the 
most common motive category behind the Chinese FDI in Finland and often these two 
motives have been combined in the same investments. Especially in the ICT sector the 
companies have come to Finland to strengthen their strategically important and long-
lasting customerships by bringing relationships closer and expanding their supply for the 
main clients. Many companies at various sectors have invested in Finland and elsewhere 
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in Europe to make profit but especially to develop their strategic assets for global and 
often also for their domestic Chinese markets. One Chinese manager of a service 
company told that they came to Central Europe and Finland to strengthen their brand and 
to develop brand management as well as quality and reliability of their services. Another 
company in the field of testing and certification is planning to invest in Finland in order 
to learn international testing and auditing skills and knowhow. 
 
Also the learning of new technology has been an important investment motive for the 
Chinese in Finland as well as in other similar high-tech countries. The companies are 
going to exploit those assets particularly in China where their business is still 
significantly larger than abroad and the learned technology is exploited mainly in the 
domestic manufacturing sites. One Chinese representative of an ICT company told that 
the company came because of the difficult high-end markets of Finland. The aim is to 
develop their operations to be quality enough for the discerning Finnish customers and if 
the aim was met, the operation will be competitive everywhere in the world. 
 
One of the major strategic assets is a competitive educated labour which has been 
acquired in Finland especially by the ICT companies. Most of the Chinese ICT 
companies have only one or few Chinese employees in Finland and they have quite 
aggressively tried to recruit Finnish key personnel, such as specialist engineers, from the 
local companies. While the recruitment style has been criticized as „purchasing of the 
brains of the local companies‟, is has not any special Chinese feature as such. Acquisition 
of the competitive human resource is a very common motive for many knowledge-
intensive MNEs to make FDI and usually it is carried out by a buyout or direct 
recruitment. An example of this in Finland is the acquisition of the Sesca Group‟s mobile 
sector and its personnel by Chinese Neusoft. Through the acquisition it gained technical 
expertise as well as local knowledge and a wider surface with the main customer in 
Finland. Globally weak economic situation reflects also in Finland and provides 
opportunities for the wealthy Chinese MNEs to recruit the redundant skilled professionals. 
For example, Huawei managed to recruit engineers who had just been dismissed 
concurrently with the factory closure by Nokia Siemens Networks (Talouselämä 2009). 
In the spring 2010, another Chinese ICT giant ZTE announced to recruit the Finnish 
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network builders (It-viikko 2010a) and end of the same year the Chinese companies were 
reported to deliver 4G network systems for Finnish phone operators Finnet and Sonera 
(Digitoday 2010; It-viikko 2010b). 
 
4.2.5 Other motives 
 
Other possible FDI motives that came out in the interviews were the real estate 
construction and speculation, risk diversification and European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA) which is located in Finland. Indeed, the last motive could be counted as a 
location factor as well. According to one interviewee, the Chinese have been very 
interested in large real estate and infrastructure projects in Finland, but they have not 
realized yet due to large cultural differences in project management and implementation. 
In other words, the Chinese do not know well enough the Western practices in the real 
estate industry, but the situation is likely to change in the future. Another Chinese 
interviewee, in turn, wondered the motives of the businessmen from the city of Wenzhou 
in eastern China who involved in a Chinese retail center business in Finland. According 
to him, the purpose was only to speculate about a possible increase of the real estate value. 
Apparently their objectives did not materialize and the speculators have left the project. 
The motive of risk diversification has been seen mainly behind the investments by the 
family enterprises. Representatives of SMEs told in the interviews that some of their 
family members are running business in other European countries and the interviewees 
came to Finland to expand their business networks in Europe. According to one Finnish 
investment specialist, also some SMEs that operate only in China have come to Finland 
in order to offset the risk because the markets are very different. China is a market of 
high profits and risks while Finland is more stable and safer. Lastly, European Chemicals 
Agency has attracted at least one Chinese consulting company to invest in Finland in 
order to support the Chinese chemical exporters in registration of their products in EU. 
FDI was made in the vicinity of ECHA so that information could flow smoothly between 
the Chinese companies and the agency.  
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4.3 Location factors of the Chinese FDI in Finland 
 
Finland does not have any location advantage that the Chinese are particularly interested 
in and that are listed at the beginning of Chapter 2.6 – i.e. low taxes, geographical 
vicinity to China, natural resources and large markets. The market is small and rather 
saturated, natural resources are not abundant, taxes and especially personal taxes are 
relatively high and Finland is both geographically and culturally remote from China. 
 
4.3.1 Factor conditions 
 
If the location factors that emerged in the interviews are discussed according to Porter‟s 
national diamond model, Finland has advanced factor conditions. Finland has a world-
class educated workforce which is not particular expensive in the European context and 
the Finnish education system was commended. Employees need only little or none further 
training after the recruitment. On the other hand, the Chinese interviewees wondered that 
the Finns do not want to work overtime or work on holiday or weekends, as the Chinese 
are used to do. Also R&D facilities and IT infrastructure in Finland received recognition, 
and they have been facilitating the Chinese FDI in Finland especially in ICT industry. 
 
Basic location factors in Finland are either rather negative or neutral. Natural resources 
are scarce and their exploitability is not particular high in comparison with other 
resource-richer countries. The climate is cool and it is not attractive to the Chinese 
although neither an obstacle, because the buildings are of good quality. Due to its small 
population and high income level, Finland has not to provide a cheap labour. However, it 
is not an obstacle to the Chinese who usually do not invest abroad because of the cheap 
labour. Many interviewees, however, consider that the Chinese do not plan to make 
manufacturing FDI in Finland because of the high labour costs. One representative of a 
Chinese company told that they came to Finland partly because the company had 
previously invested in Germany and the same business model was easy to duplicate 
successfully in Finland because of the similarity of the countries. 
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The geographical location of Finland is rather weak and also good, the opinion depended 
on the interviewee. Some of them lamented that Finland is tucked away from the large 
European markets although it belongs both to the EU and the euro area, and its location is 
not pivotal even in the Nordic context. On the other hand, some interviewees found out 
its location to be good between East and West, close to the markets of northwestern 
Russia and the Baltic countries. Yet, the vicinity of the Russian markets has not attracted 
many Chinese MNEs to invest in Finland. According to one Finnish investment specialist, 
this is a consequence of the fact that the Russian market has not been marketed to the 
Chinese effectively enough and the favorable location of Finland has been overlooked. 
He added that it would be possible to develop huge logistics warehouses in Finland from 
where the products would be exported into the Russian markets while the Chinese 
companies could reduce the country risk of operating in Russia. One wholesale center has 
been established near to the Russian border, initially for serving the Chinese retailer in 
northwestern Russia, but the business has not flourished because the transfer of goods to 
Russia was felt to be too difficult and there are not enough customers in Finland. Several 
Finnish and Chinese investment experts and also a Finnish country manager of one 
Chinese enterprise considered it important that the shortest flight route from China to the 
EU goes through Finland. The country manager added that there are approximately the 
equally long flights to Beijing and New York from Finland, so the North European 
headquarters / office would be practical to establish in Finland due to relatively short 
flights. Nevertheless, the Chinese interviewees did not raise this issue and it appears that 
short flights to China have not affected the Chinese investments in Finland thus far. 
 
4.3.2 Demand conditions 
 
From the aspect of demand conditions, Finland is a small market with a moderate GDP 
and growth of it, as usual also in other small developed countries, which does not 
motivate the Chinese who are seeking a rapid growth. Size of the domestic market has 
attracted only smaller or service business companies to invest in Finland. Interviewed 
Chinese representative of a Chinese service firm expects that the sum that the Finns use 
in services will increase and consequently the market for services will grow in the future. 
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This is likely to attract also other Chinese companies in the field of services to come to 
Finland. Potential for this exists since the income level of the Finnish population is high. 
The markets of the Baltic Sea Region and whole the Europe are, by contrast, more 
interesting from the perspective of Chinese MNEs. For those larger markets, Finland has 
been seen as a fairly good "test-bed" to develop the offer of specific products and services, 
particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors. If the products and services are good enough 
for the demanding Finnish hi-tech clients, their prospects seem good for the European 
and the global markets. There have been practical examples of test-bed operations of this 
kind by the Asian companies in the 1970s when the Japanese automobile and consumer 
electronics manufacturers tested the European markets first in Finland before established 
themselves into the larger markets. One Chinese company told that the large Finnish 
telephone operator was their first large Western mainstream operator whereby the 
Chinese solved the technical problems related to broadband subscriptions. Furthermore, 
currently the Chinese company operates in Europe with great success. Furthermore, 
according to a Finnish investment specialist, also Chinese medicine companies could 
come to Finland to develop their products because Finland possesses and extraordinary 
large number of long-term data on the screened genetic population. 
 
Culturally and linguistically Finland is certainly far from China. There is still a quite 
small Chinese minority in Finland although its size has grown relatively rapidly in the 
2000s. In 2009 there were 5,180 Chinese citizens and, in addition, the number of the 
ethnic Chinese with the Finnish citizenship was around 1,500 (Statistics Finland 2011). 
Due to the smallness of the Chinese population, there has not been much demand for 
typical Chinese goods, such as groceries, and the Chinese ecosystem is still too small for 
the Chinese entrepreneurs who are accustomed to act in a "bazaar culture", as one Finnish 
interviewee called the Chinese type of business circles. The Chinese have not met 
language problems in the working life since English is widely spoken in Finland. 
However, there have been problems, for example, in shopping or dealing with the 
authorities because almost all the documents and texts are in Finnish. This problem 
concerns also the investment procedures and the Chinese investors cannot stay constantly 
up to date how the application and notification processes are progressing. For this, they 
have needed to employ local staff or outsourced assistance. Nevertheless, the language 
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barriers have not actually prevented the Chinese from investing in Finland but it may 
rather be regarded as a discomfort factor. Finally, both the Chinese and Finnish 
interviewees thought that the similar, diligence and pragmatic, temperament of the 
Finnish and Chinese people fits well at both personal as well as company level, which 
facilitates the integration in Finland and negotiations in the investment process. 
 
4.3.3 Related and supporting industries 
 
Regarding the related and supporting industries, the competitiveness and location 
advantage of Finland is clear. Nokia led, even globally significant, ICT cluster has 
attracted several large Chinese ICT and software companies to Finland (e.g. Greater 
Helsinki region, Tampere and Oulu) because they have supplier or other customer 
relationships with the major Finnish companies, mainly with Nokia or telephone 
operators. In that field there are also numerous smaller companies with whom the 
Chinese companies could collaborate, or from which they are able to purchase specific 
assets e.g. by acquisitions. The ICT cluster also provides research expertise of the Finnish 
universities, research and consultancy companies and other technology research and 
development organization, such as VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) and 
Tekes (Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation). Exploitation of the 
expertise usually requires the cooperation with the local enterprises and society. Other 
strong areas of expertise in Finland are, among others, cleantech, nanotechnology and 
biopharmacy, but there have been only a few Chinese FDI in those sectors although there 
are lots of operations between Finnish and Chinese companies and organizations in those 
industries.  
 
4.3.4 Rivalry in Finland 
 
Finally, as discussed already in the previous chapter, competition in Finland has been an 
attraction factor for some Chinese companies. Unusual tough competition of customers 
between the telephone operators serves as an experimental field for one Chinese ICT for 
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testing and developing of their competitiveness, and nowadays it holds a firm position 
both in Finland and globally. On the other hand, the smaller and service companies have 
been satisfied that the competition in Finland is not too fierce, especially with other 
Chinese competitors. The clientele for them is pretty small but it does not need to be huge, 
as long as companies offering similar products are not too many. According to the larger 
Chinese companies it is positive the government in Finland has not intervened in the 
competition by using protectionist measures, but the competition between domestic and 
foreign firms is free and fair. Finland is an export-driven country so the Finnish 
companies must take account of the international demand and competition. On the other 
hand, there are relatively few large or growing international companies in Finland, which 
does not support the interest of the foreign companies, including the Chinese ones, as 
consequently the number of business contacts is limited. 
 
4.3.5 Political and regulative factors 
 
The role of the government and its policies has been either positive or neutral as a 
location factor of Finland from the standpoint of the Chinese investors. According to the 
Chinese interviewees, the role of the state of Finland is positive and the administration is 
stable and transparent but it does not offer much practical support, such as incentives e.g. 
in a form of tax deductions, but the Chinese companies are treated similarly with the local 
companies. At the same time, during the 1990s and 2000s organizations, such as Invest in 
Finland and Greater Helsinki Promotion, have been established which provide free 
assistance for the companies that invest in Finland. Also several Chinese companies have 
benefited from the assistance. In addition to the above-mentioned support organizations 
also the openness of the society towards foreign companies, the cheapness and easiness 
of the business establishing, the lightness of the bureaucracy, the clarity of the legislation 
as well as the high level of education have been praised by the Chinese interviewees.  
 
At the political level, there is no friction between Finland and China and relations have 
remained good since the formation of the Communist China. This was seen very 
important in the interviews. The agreement on scientific and technological cooperation 
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(TT) between Finland and China was signed already in 1987 and it was expanded to the 
economic, industrial and technical cooperation (TTT) agreement in 2005. However, as 
already mentioned in Chapter 2.6, such agreements rarely have an increasing impact on 
the Chinese investment and this seems to hold also between China and Finland. Finland‟s 
membership in the Schengen Area and EU Internal Market has been more important for 
the Chinese FDI than the membership in the Euro area, as reflected for example in the 
fact that the euro area, Sweden is not included in the Finnish attracted more Chinese 
investment. As an example of this is that Sweden which does not belong in the Euro area 
has attracted much more Chinese FDI than Finland. Instead, the exchange rate of euro to 
the US dollar and Chinese yuan impacts significantly in the Chinese companies. Most of 
the Chinese MNEs that operates in Finland are global companies that do business in 
several currencies, while there is a little difference if the currency is euro or not, but the 
exchange rate affect greatly what kind of business activity is beneficial at any given time. 
Cheap euro might encourage the Chinese to invest more in Finland. Smaller firms may 
benefit from the euro if its other European branches are also located in the euro area, 
when the branches can operate in the same currency. Otherwise the currency fluctuation 
risk may be too big for them. However, obviously not too many Chinese know that euro 
is used in Finland and thus do not take it into account when considering investments in 
northern Europe. 
 
Chinese government's representative in Finland regrets that the investment information is 
fragmented between various organizations in Finland, and not all information is available 
even in English, not to mention Chinese. This has hampered the information search of the 
Chinese prior to possible investments. Thus the so-called one-desk system would be 
needful, from where the investors would be able to receive all the necessary information 
at once. The immigration policy of Finland has felt fair by the Chinese and the authorities 
are professional although one Chinese interviewee told that the applying for the residence 
permits in Finnish Embassy was a difficult and time consuming process. The trade union 
in Finland has praised to be stable but it has also hampered one Chinese company‟s 
operations in Finland. A Chinese manager of the company complained that he is not able 
to negotiate about certain dispute with anyone because the trade union does not agree to 
talk and thus the situation remains in deadlock. He was also surprised about the ability of 
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some trade unions to stop the export and import of Finland in full, which does serious 
harm to the country, its economy and the companies operating there. 
 
The company taxation of Finland has felt to be reasonable, but the income tax to be high. 
For example, the Chinese who are working in a similar job in Germany has more for 
consumption after taxes and the consumer prices are generally cheaper than in Finland. 
According to one Chinese interviewee, the Finns have a lot of free services in payment 
for high taxes. These services improve their ability to purchase, but it does provide very 
little benefit for the Chinese who are working in Finland. To the Chinese interviewees, 
the Finnish society appears to be open, peaceful and safe, and the country is clean and 
environmentally friendly. The locals are honest and their attitude towards the foreigners 
is mostly good. Nevertheless, the number of foreigners and foreign companies is 
relatively small and there are not too many Chinese, which reflects e.g. in the narrow 
supply of the Asian groceries. Again, the food offering has expanded significantly during 
the recent years by the increased number of foreigners and nationalities in Finland. Also, 
few primary schools in Helsinki and Vantaa have begun to provide teaching in Chinese. 
Some Finnish investment experts believe it to be important for the Chinese family 
enterprises when considering of establishing themselves in Finland. Chinese teaching is 
also positive for the families of the Chinese MNEs‟ personnel in Finland. 
 
4.3.6 Role of networks 
 
Finally, when it comes to business relationship networks in certain location, a wide 
student society of certain nationalities has found to be as essential location advantage. 
According to the OECD statistics (2011), the number of the Chinese higher education 
students in Finland was altogether 1,859 in 2008. The figure is fairly large in comparison 
with the other European small developed economies. For example, in Denmark the figure 
was 1,789, in Norway 752, in Sweden 2,087 and in the Netherlands about 3,400 Chinese 
students in 2011. The figures are, of course, much smaller than in the large immigration 
countries, such as the USA (110,000), the UK (51,000) and Canada (36,000). Apparently, 
the Chinese students have been attracted by the good level and especially free tuition of 
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the Finnish education, but the problem has been the poor employment of the graduated 
Chinese students. Usually, they leave Finland for job seeking either back in China or 
larger western countries, while Finland loses not only a skilled and multilingual Chinese 
labour but also their contact networks between China and Finland, which does not affect 
positively in the prospects of the Chinese FDI in Finland. This problem is known, for 
example, among the interviewed Finnish experts but the local companies employ 
preferably students with fluent Finnish skills.  
 
A Chinese business executive told that the service company of which he represents came 
to Finland almost entirely due to his activeness to the headquarters in China. He has 
firstly studied and then worked as a tourism entrepreneur in Finland. He managed to 
convince the Chinese top management to invest with his knowledge of the Finnish market 
and the country. Apparently there are relatively few this kind of Chinese-created contact 
networks in Finland, especially because the majority of the Chinese students leave the 
country after their graduation. According to the Chinese investment expert, it is very 
important for the Chinese businessmen that they would have a certain Chinese trusted 
person in the country who “pulls” their investment in the country. Generally speaking, 
usually an investing Chinese company has a ready contact in the country or 
representatives of it have visited there frequently before FDI. This has been the 
background of the several Chinese FDI in Finland as well.   
 
4.4 Comparison of the motives and location factors of the Chinese FDI in Finland 
and Sweden 
  
Finland and Sweden are very similar and geographically close countries. Sweden is larger 
than Finland both by its population and economy and it has a longer history of 
internationality. The inward and outward FDI stocks in Sweden have been roughly three 
times larger than those in Finland although the Swedish economy is only 1.6-1.8 times 
and foreign trade twice larger than the Finnish. The difference is especially immense in 
the numbers of the Chinese FDI in Sweden and Finland. However, the interviews and 
other background material of this study suggest that there are only little differences in the 
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motives and location factors behind the Chinese FDI in these countries. The difference in 
the amount of the investments is mainly explained by the strength of certain factors in 
Sweden and their weakness in Finland as well as by the facts that Sweden has made 
invest-in activities longer and with larger volume in China than Finland. 
 
4.4.1 FDI Motives 
 
The motives of the Chinese FDI in Sweden are largely the same as in Finland, but the 
implementation of the FDI is further in Sweden, while in Finland they are still mostly in 
the phase of talks and planning. By quantity, the most Chinese FDI in Sweden has made 
for the trade and services, i.e. market seeking ones, and they have been relatively small 
on average. Especially the Chinese whole sale center Fanerdun, which was built in 
Kalmar in the southeast of Sweden, attracted dozens of small Chinese trading investments, 
but currently the business in the center has been suspended by the payments difficulties 
of the property owner. In China, Sweden is seen as the center and leading economy of the 
Nordic Countries because its central location offers an easy access to cover also the other 
markets in the Baltic Sea region, such as Finland, the Baltic Countries, Norway and 
Denmark. Anyhow, a Swedish investment specialist supposes that the location of Finland 
is a more attracting if the target of the FDI is to cover particularly the Russian and Baltic 
markets. Sweden, such like Finland, is located in EU and the Schengen area, which 
facilitates the transportation and trade within Europe and attracts market-oriented FDI. In 
addition, in Sweden the considerable large Chinese community has attracted market 
seeking investments, because it provides markets for the Chinese type products. In some 
cases, the Chinese FDI have been made in Sweden in order to reduce a dependence on the 
local agent or distributor, or to strengthen the sales along with the remaining agents. 
These can be classified both as market seeking as well as efficiency seeking FDI. 
 
Unlike Finland, Sweden has received a couple of resource seeking FDI from China, for 
example in the forest industry, although there have been also other motives behind those 
investments. One Chinese energy company came to Sweden to produce ethanol because 
the raw material (wood) is produced in Sweden. Nevertheless, the ultimate target has 
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been to develop and test the manufacturing method in Sweden - because of the industry 
know-how of the Swedes - and use the method mainly in China in the future. 
 
As in Finland, the large Chinese ICT companies have been active also in Sweden. Kista 
ICT cluster near to Stockholm, the traditional giant Ericsson as its beacon, has attracted 
both Huawei and ZTE to invest and both have opened their R&D centers in Kista. In 
2010, Huawei had already 300 employees in R&D and 100 employees in marketing 
departments, and the majority of Huawei U8300 Android smartphone has been developed 
in Kista. The company has clearly centralized its North Europe hub in Sweden (Computer 
Sweden 2010). Huawei‟s another R&D center in the small developed economies is 
located in the Netherlands. The Chinese companies have benefitted from customerships 
and cooperation with other companies in the cluster, such as Ericsson, but actually 
Huawei‟s initial FDI in Sweden occurred at the beginning of the 2000s when Ericsson 
was facing deep trouble. In those days, Ericsson had to reduce its staff drastically and 
consequently there were many unemployed engineers in the labour market from which 
Huawei was able to acquire the strategic asset from a competent workforce. Ever since 
the size of Huawei personnel has increased in Sweden while Sony Ericsson has cut its 
staff.  The largest transition to Huawei was experienced a few years ago when Sony 
Ericsson closed its entire R&D function in Sweden. As discussed in the earlier chapters, 
there has been similar Chinese FDI also in Finland during last three years, albeit their size 
has been notably smaller than in Sweden. One manager of the Chinese ICT company told 
that they have been rather careful with Nokia and did not want to irritate it too much by 
coming earlier and more strongly into the Finnish market. Apparently, Nokia has hold a 
stronger global market position and status in the industry than Ericsson, and it has 
hindered the Chinese ICT companies to establish themselves in Finland more than in 
Sweden.  
 
In Sweden, there have been Chinese strategic asset seeking FDI in cleantech sector as 
well. Thus far the most significant Chinese strategic asset seeking FDI in Sweden has 
been the acquisition of Volvo by Geely Automobile. There have been Chinese 
acquisitions also in the other industries, such as bioscience, metallurgy, retail, tourism 
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and other service industries. The motives have been both market and strategic asset 
seeking. 
 
In addition to above mentioned motives, in the interviews of the Swedes raised a few 
specific motives for the Chinese investments in Sweden. According to some interviewee, 
in some industries the Chinese MNEs uses their branch in Sweden in international 
bidding contests - e.g. in East Europe and Africa - instead of the parent company in China 
in order to have more creditability and acceptability for their offers. If the company wins 
the order, the particular delivery is done, in most cases, from the parent company. In 
other words, the function of many Chinese investments in Sweden is to acquire new 
customers for the parent company in China, not only in the emerging markets but also in 
Northern and Western European countries. In the earlier mentioned project in Kalmar one 
main motive for the smaller investors was legal immigration to the EU and even 
residence permits were promised for the owners and employees of the Chinese companies 
which invest in the center. Previously, the relatively lax immigration policy of Sweden 
has plainly increased the interest of the Chinese towards immigration motived FDI in the 
country. The initial motives behind the Kalmar project itself were the speculation on the 
potential growth of the real estate price and a desire to benefit from the small Chinese 
companies‟ wishes to internationalize and access into Europe. For the original investor 
was enough that he managed to sell the shares to the Chinese entrepreneurs in Sweden. In 
fact, the actual success of trade in the center was not important to him. 
 
4.4.2 Location factors 
 
When compared the location advantages between Finland and Sweden, many factors 
were found in the interviews that have brought clear benefits in favour of Sweden and 
explain why the Chinese have been more interested to invest there instead of Finland. 
According to the interviewees, geographically the countries have only a little distinction. 
Sweden is more central in the North Europe context and Finland closer to Russia, but 
obviously these facts have not been the key factors in the FDI decisions of the Chinese 
MNEs. The Chinese, Swedish as well as Finnish interviewees believed that the general 
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level location factors which are stronger in Sweden than in Finland are open society, i.e. 
the Swedes (both people and companies) are more internationally oriented, Sweden has 
more immigrants and the number of the Chinese is more than three times larger than in 
Finland. According to Swedish Immigrant-institutet (2010), in 2009 there were 21,200 
registered Chinese in Sweden and some Swedish interviewees told that those Chinese are 
well-networked with each other. In addition, at least six Chinese law firms operate in 
Stockholm and their staff speaks both Chinese and Swedish. As already mentioned earlier, 
the Chinese usually find their way to the regions where there already are their fellow 
countrymen. The first Chinese people moved to Sweden already in the 1780s.  
 
The Chinese interviewees think that Swedish is an easier language to learn and 
understand than Finnish, and there is more information available in English in Sweden. 
Still, some interviewees have experienced that the language is a problem for the Chinese 
both in Finland and Sweden. The Chinese who have lived both in Finland and Sweden 
told that there is a wider selection of food and other consumer products in Sweden and 
the prices are cheaper because of the more international competition. Also, travelling 
abroad is easier and cheaper from Sweden. However, one of them told that it is still nicer 
to live in Finland, perhaps because of the fact that there still are no major problems with a 
large number of immigrants, so she thought that the foreigners, at least the Chinese, are 
treated kinder in Finland than in Sweden. Another Chinese interviewee praised that 
although the Chinese community is smaller in Finland, the spirit of it is closer and 
warmer than in Sweden. Yet, one Chinese thought that the Finns do not like foreigners 
and are ethnocentric. 
 
When it comes to educational factors, one Finnish interviewee supposed that the 
researcher cooperation between the universities has been wider and has a longer history 
between China and Sweden than between China and Finland. This cooperation has 
obviously generated new Chinese enterprises more in Sweden and also attracted the 
Chinese to invest from China. Unlike the OECD statistics indicated above, the Swedish 
Embassy in China reported that there would be up to about 5,000 Chinese students in 
Sweden (more than double than in Finland) and the number has increased steadily 
(Sveriges Ambassade Peking, 2010). However, currently the number of the new Chinese 
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students in Sweden is declining rapidly because Sweden introduced tuition fees for the 
students coming from outside Europe in the autumn of 2010 (Nyteknik 2011). 
 
In addition to the location factors of the Swedish and Finnish societies, the advantage of 
Sweden is also its broader industrial base which creates more opportunities for trade and 
cooperation as well as acquisitions. Sweden has had continuous trade relations with 
China since the 17
th
 century onwards. Furthermore, according to the Chinese, Sweden, 
Stockholm, the Swedish brands and especially consumer product manufacturers (e.g. 
Volvo, Saab, Ikea, Ericsson, Electrolux, Astra) are well-known in China. Among the 
Finnish companies, only Nokia‟s reputation reaches at the same level of renown in China. 
Because its familiarity, Sweden is generally regarded as the center of the North Europe in 
China and they invest in Sweden often intuitively without a deeper examination of the 
other optional locations in the region. Also, there are more Swedish than Finnish 
companies in China and Sweden has there a well-established chamber of commerce 
which was opened in 1998 and nowadays it has around 230 member companies, whereas 
the Finnish companies are only now setting up their own chamber of commerce in China. 
Nearly 500 Swedish companies have a local presence in China while the number of the 
Finnish companies is around 300. According to the interviewees, the companies and their 
established operations in China have had a clear positive impact on the interest of the 
Chinese MNEs toward Sweden. Finally, the Chinese know Sweden, for instance, of their 
royal family and good success in football which is very popular in China. 
 
Regardless of their nationality, most of the interviewees think that the Swedes know how 
to market their country and businesses better than the Finns. ISA opened its office in 
China already in 2002, soon after China launched its “go global” policy. ISA‟s office was 
the second western invest-in unit after the UK in China. Nowadays ISA has altogether 
more than ten employees and a relatively high budget in China, which has been reflected 
e.g. in good visibility in the investment fairs. The strong presence of ISA has clearly 
yielded results and the Chinese MNEs have found their way into Sweden. Invest in 
Finland opened its branch in China relatively late, in 2010, and has now two local 
employees in the country. Apparently, the more centralized invest-in operations of 
Sweden have worked better than more decentralized template of Finland, in which also 
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local players visit and operate in China besides Invest in Finland. Some interviewees 
were concerned that because of this the resources are scattered and a common message 
and country brand may become vague. In short, the visibility of Sweden has been much 
wider than Finland and the contact networks of the Swedes are broader in China. The 
Chinese hardly know the countries and the differences between them in North Europe, so 
the country promotion is very important. The Swedes got a foothold and a good position 
in China just before the competition for the Chinese outward FDI was really about to 
begin. In this respect, Finland has clearly lagged behind, even though the opportunity is 
not completely lost yet, but the gap is long.  
 
On the other hand, at the political level Sweden has not supported the business as 
strongly as the Finnish government in China and it has posed e.g. human rights issues 
more visible than Finland. Interestingly, this has proved to be only little or none negative 
effect on the amount of Chinese FDI in Sweden, or alternatively a positive impact on that 
in Finland. The Chinese think that taxes are high in Sweden, just like in Finland. As a 
result, the staff costs are higher than in China because the salary of the Chinese expatriate 
must be increased so that his/her net salary would remain at the same level as in China. 
Transparency of the governance has been perceived to be positive also in Sweden, but for 
some Chinese it is strange that they cannot negotiate with the authorities e.g. about the 
level of taxes or other statutory requirements as they do in China. 
 
Finally, several Chinese and Finnish interviewees think that there is apparent fear in 
Finland, not only towards the Chinese FDI but also towards inward FDI in general. The 
country has traditionally focused more on exports and outward FDI while inward FDI is 
mainly “a necessary evil”. The interviewees told that this attitude is reflected even at the 
governmental level which appears e.g. as under resourcing of Invest in Finland. In 
addition, one interviewee thinks that the growth has not been sought from the foreign 
investments and new openings, but rather by supporting the old existing structures. Only 
during the very recent years the attitudes and efforts have been reviewed. In the future, 
the retirement of the large generations may open up new opportunities for Chinese FDI 
both in Finland and Sweden. Many small businesses are going to be without a successor 
while the former owner retires, and this could make them suitable acquisition targets for 
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the Chinese entrepreneurs and companies. For example, the Germans have already sought 
actively and successfully for investors and entrepreneurs from China to make up the 
shortage of entrepreneurs in Germany. 
 
  
99 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
 
In this final chapter the findings of the study are discussed and then they are analyzed on 
the basis of the theoretical framework and setting introduced in Chapter 2.  Next, the 
limitations of the study will be discussed and finally suggestions for further research will 
be proposed. Due to the nature of the research problem, the managerial implications are 
not discussed in this study. 
 
5.1 Summary of the main findings 
 
The empirical results were divided in three parts: the motives of the Chinese FDI in 
Finland, the location factors of the Chinese FDI in Finland and comparison of these 
between Finland and Sweden. However, before the results there was an introduction of 
the development of the Chinese FDI activity in general as well as the position of the 
Chinese FDI in the small developed economies. This was written for clarity of the subtext 
behind the research problem. 
 
Chinese FDI activities have increased rapidly in the wake of the country's economic 
growth over the last thirty years, but the largest investments are still made by either SOEs 
or private corporations with a strong funding from the Chinese government. Most of the 
FDI have been made intra-regionally, particularly into Hong Kong, and most the 
investing MNEs are still only slightly internationalized while the bulk of their revenues 
come the domestic markets. The Chinese typically invest in the international tax havens, 
financial centers, resource-rich countries as well as large consumer markets. By sectors, 
they invest mostly in business services, extractive industry, finance and trade. The 
Chinese FDI usually support the imports of raw-materials and fuels as well as the exports 
of commodities, or they have been made for seeking tax benefits for round-trip or further 
investments. Chinese have invested very little in the small developed economies except 
the special cases, such as the resource-rich Australia and Canada, the above-mentioned 
Hong Kong and Singapore inhabited by the ethnic Chinese. If compared with the other 
remaining small developed economies, Sweden has received a fair amount of Chinese 
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FDI while Finland is among the last. Thus these two countries are relatively good 
examples of the “normal” small developed economies as the host countries for the 
Chinese FDI. Stock of the Chinese FDI in Sweden is 12 times bigger than in Finland, 
although also Finland has managed to attract the Chinese investment in a growing 
number during last few years. Anyhow, the figures have still been relatively insignificant 
in Finland so far.  
 
The Chinese have not made too many investments in Finland and the most of the FDI 
have had either market or strategic asset seeking motives behind them. There has not 
been any resource seeking FDI and only one investment which can be counted as an 
efficiency seeking one in the logistics sector. Market seeking investors have mainly been 
small Chinese companies operating independently or in a wholesale center. However, 
apparently their success has not been too good in Finland since the market is small, there 
are not enough suitable customers and it has been difficult to sell to the neighbouring 
Russian market owing to the problematic border between the countries. Another group of 
the Chinese MNEs that have made market seeking FDI in Finland are ICT and software 
companies which have been attracted to invest by the Nokia-led ICT cluster. Nokia and 
other Finnish ICT, software and teleoperator companies are important customers for the 
Chinese MNEs globally and they have wanted to strengthen the business relationship by 
investing in the vicinity of the customer corporates‟ headquarters in Finland. The market 
seeking FDI are usually made for serving larger market area than the just Finland. These 
markets include neighbouring countries, such as The Nordic and Baltic countries, and on 
a larger scale even the European and global markets depending on the nature of the 
customerships. Surprisingly, the Chinese FDI have not made to serve the Russian market. 
Only one interviewed company has covered Russia by the FDI made in Finland and now 
it has also deducted from the area responsibilities of the subsidiary in Finland. 
 
Many Chinese market seeking FDI also have had strategic asset seeking motives behind 
them, especially in above-mentioned ICT, software and teleoperator industries. In these, 
customerships are long-term and global, thus they are usually counted as strategic. The 
FDI have strengthened the position of the Chinese parent MNEs in the global competition 
with the stable customer relations. At the same time, the MNEs have successfully 
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developed and tested their products and services together with the local customer and 
partner companies as well as learned international business and management by operating 
in Finland. This has improved their competitiveness both in their home market and also in 
the international markets, which has been one of the initial reasons for the FDI decisions. 
The Chinese have sought new technology and knowhow also by acquisitions. With 
acquisitions they have managed quickly to gain new technology, customers as well as 
skilled labour. Top-level engineers have been tried to attract also from the local hi-tech 
companies which have had pressures to reduce their personnel. 
 
Other motives that were raised in the interviews are real estate construction and 
speculation, risk diversification by the small Chinese family enterprises as well as 
European Chemical Agency (REACH) which is located in Helsinki and attracted the 
Chinese consulting companies to establish themselves in Finland to support the 
registering of the Chinese chemicals in the EU market. 
 
As most small developed economies, either Finland does not have location advantages 
that particularly attract the Chinese investors. Taxes are high, natural resources relatively 
scarce, the market is small and it is far from China and Chinese culture. The number of 
the Chinese and Chinese students in Finland is minor although quite quick-growing. 
Because of this the awareness of Finland has been weak in China and the Chinese people 
do not feel attractive to come to Finland because they thrive in a society of countrymen 
which would also facilitate their businesses. Although only a very few speak Chinese in 
Finland the language has not been felt to be a problem as the most Finnish can speak 
English. Moreover, climate of Finland is not too pleasant and blue-collar labour costs as 
well as the general cost level are not attractive. Furthermore, the general price level of 
Finland has been noticed to be high even in European context, e.g. when compared with 
Germany.  The geographical location of Finland is distant from the large markets but 
Russia, but this location factor has not pulled the Chinese into Finland although it has 
possible potential in the future depending on the development of the Russian border 
formalities. Neither has the shortest flight route from China to EU, which goes through 
Finland, attracted the Chinese – although this is considered an attractive factor for the 
Chinese investors in some Finnish circles.  
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Obviously the most important single location factor that has attracted the Chinese FDI in 
Finland is the ICT and software cluster led by Nokia. Cooperation with the companies in 
the cluster is important to many Chinese MNEs in the sector. Also developed 
infrastructure and the support from several institutions, such as universities and research 
organizations have facilitated the presence of the Chinese ICT companies in Finland. 
Furthermore, because of the developed technology, the demanding customer base and 
some special features in the Finnish teleoperator business, Finland has been appreciated 
being a good test-bed for developing products and service for the whole European market. 
Some Chinese ICT companies have made pilot projects with the Finnish customer firms 
and have been able to use these experiences also elsewhere. Also, Finland has strong 
location advantage in educated labour - especially engineers - that is one of the main 
factors that have attracted the Chinese MNEs to invest into the country.  
 
Openness and stable administration system of Finland has been positive from the Chinese 
standpoint. The country is safe and clean and education is free, which is important 
especially for small Chinese businesses and expatriates‟ families. Supportive invest-in 
organizations, such as Invest in Finland, Greater Helsinki Promotion and Golden Bridge, 
have helped the Chinese FDI in establishing themselves in Finland but the number of 
these cases has been limited. In addition, the political relations between China and 
Finland have been good for long and there are several bilateral cooperation agreements. 
Anyhow, their impact on the Chinese FDI is rather ambiguous and apparent low. Also 
importance of Finland‟s membership in the euro area has been insignificant for the 
Chinese investors, meanwhile fluctuation of the currency rates between euro and dollar or 
Chinese yuan has been more influential for the Chinese businesses. Because of the 
saturated market, the growth rate of the Finnish economy is low but the average 
purchasing power is high which attract the Chinese service companies. They see good 
prospects for further service FDI in the future.  
 
Finally, because of the smallness of the Chinese society in Finland and loss of the 
Chinese students to abroad after their graduation from the Finnish schools the crucial 
human networks between the Chinese in China and Finland have been sparse and 
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embryonic. Many Finnish and Chinese companies have solid trade relationships but these 
have not for one reason or another generated many Chinese investments in Finland.  
 
In the final chapter of the empirical findings the motives and location factors of the 
Chinese FDI were compared between Finland and Sweden. This was done in order to find 
if there are some major differences between these two rather alike small developed 
economies and what are the reasons for multifold Chinese FDI in Sweden compared with 
Finland. Generally speaking, Sweden has made and received clearly more outward and 
inward FDI than Finland and this is particularly pronounced in the Chinese inward FDI. 
Nevertheless, the results of the study indicate that there are only little differences in the 
motives of the Chinese FDI and location factors in the countries. The main reasons 
explaining the larger number of Chinese investments in Sweden are the strength of 
certain location factors in Sweden and their more active invest-in operations in China. 
 
Sweden has received quite many market seeking FDI from China and many of them are 
small trade and service investments. Especially the Chinese wholesale center in Kalmar 
attracted investments of this kind. Sweden, which is a member of EU and the Schengen 
Agreement, is perceived to be the central of the North Europe and it is easy to cover the 
whole market from there. Sweden has also attracted a couple of Chinese resource seeking 
FDI, e.g. in the energy sector. However, the innermost motives have obviously been 
strategic since the investing companies are meanwhile learning the novel technology of 
use of the raw materials and going to use it in China. As in Finland, there have been 
many FDI by the Chinese ICT companies in Sweden, but unlike in Finland they have 
already set up large R&D centers in Sweden to serve the parent company globally. 
Investments have been done rather simultaneously with the deep problems of the local 
giant Sony-Ericsson which suggest opportunistic motives to gain strategic assets, for 
instance, by hiring the personnel terminated by Sony-Ericsson. The similar development 
of the Chinese ICT activities has been observed also in Finland, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Strength of Nokia has apparently hindered the Chinese ambitions to expand in Finland 
until the very recent years. Besides ICT sector, Chinese companies have been active also 
e.g. in cleantech and automobile sectors where they have made several strategic asset 
acquisitions. Other distinct motives of Chinese in Sweden that have not found in Finland, 
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at least directly from the interviews, have been the use of FDI as a vehicle in international 
bidding contests as well as an access to a legal residence in Europe through an investment. 
However, there have been signs about the latter motive also in Finland in the case of 
Kouvola China Center.    
 
On the location factors, Sweden has clear advantages compared with Finland that have 
facilitated the Chinese FDI. The Chinese society in Sweden is larger and has a much 
longer history than in Finland. The trade relations between China and Sweden have 
existed already for more than 300 years. In general, Sweden is more internationally 
oriented and the language is easier than Finnish which makes it easier to live for the 
Chinese. The high level of education is a location advantage of both countries, but 
apparently the Swedish-Chinese research cooperation between the universities is deeper 
and thus generated new investment opportunities. As a country, Sweden is better known 
than Finland in China, apparently because of its wide industrial base and several global 
brands of consumer goods. There are more Swedish companies with deeper cooperation 
with the local partners in China and they are well represented e.g. by the Swedish 
Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, Invest in Sweden Agency has operated perceptibly in 
China already for almost a decade and it has invested there more human and monetary 
resources than the Finnish invest-in organizations. This has probably had the largest 
single impact on the enthusiasm of the Chinese to invest in Sweden. Politically Finland 
has had apparently better relationships with the Chinese regime while the Swedish 
politicians have paid less attention to business issues and raised sensitive questions e.g. 
about human rights in China. Nevertheless, this has hardly had too negative influence on 
the Swedish-Chinese investment environment. Obviously the traditional lack of interest 
and even reluctance of the Finnish society and government towards the inward FDI has 
had a negative impact of the number of the Chinese FDI in the country. Very little has 
been devoted to attract the Chinese FDI which has clearly reflected in the results 
compared with Sweden.  
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5.2 Theoretical implications 
 
The objective of this study is to explore firstly, what have been the main motives behind 
the Chinese FDI in small developed economies and secondly, which location factors / 
advantages of those economies have especially attracted the Chinese to invest. The case 
country has been Finland and it has then been compared with Sweden in order to find are 
the results similar in these two small developed economies.  
 
Theories that discuss about FDI motives are relatively few and Dunning‟s taxonomy of 
resource, market, efficiency and strategic asset seeking motives (1993) is perceived to be 
the most comprehensive of them. Thus it has been utilized also in this study. Location 
factors and advantages that attract foreign investments into certain locations/countries 
have been discussed more in the FDI literature. In this study location factors for Chinese 
FDI in destination countries are mainly examined through Porter‟s national diamond 
model (1990) and L-advantages of Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1998; 
Dunning 2002, 418-424; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 323-327). 
 
Since there is virtually no previous literature on Chinese FDI in small developed 
economies FDI, the motives and location factors affecting Chinese FDI - as well as the 
special features of Chinese FDI context - have been firstly discussed at a general level. 
However, this provides a valuable baseline to compare how much the research results of 
this study reflect the previous literature of the Chinese FDI and if the small developed 
economies possess some distinct features.  
 
At general level, the Chinese FDI have mostly had either resource or market seeking 
motives, while also strategic resource seeking has recently become an increasingly 
important (Deng 2009; Gugler & Boie 2008, Buckley et al. 2008b). According to the 
results of this study, the main motives of the Chinese FDI in the small developed 
economies are market and strategic asset seeking. There are some reasons for the results. 
Although size and growth rate of the markets in the small developed economies are quite 
low, the market seeking is attractive because of high income level of the population, long 
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trading relations from China call for trade support investments and openness of the 
countries provides opportunities to use them as export-platforms to the larger markets. 
The Chinese have also established large wholesale centers in several countries but in 
most cases they have not bloomed, maybe because the ultimate motives of the founders 
have obviously been real estate speculations and rental fees from the Chinese small-scale 
manufacturing due to high production costs. This result is in line with Buckley et al. 
(2008b) that the Chinese utilize manufacturing FDI mostly in other low-cost countries 
near to the large and rich markets.   
 
The high level of development in these economies usually means that a country possesses 
assets, i.e. advanced factor conditions (Porter 1990, 74-77), such as technology, educated 
labour and brands, as well as developed legislation and research institutions. All these 
facilitate the Chinese strategic asset seeking FDI and acquisitions of assets in those 
countries, such as in Finland and Sweden which were examined in this study. Access to 
the local capital markets has not been an important reason for the Chinese to invest into 
the typical small developed economies (excluding Hong Kong and Singapore) since their 
capital markets are rather limited and the Chinese investors have received their finance 
mostly from the Chinese banks if needed. This is inconsistent with the result of Deng 
(2004) and indicates the strengthening of the Chinese domestic financial institutions 
during the recent years. 
 
Resource seeking FDI are rarer because of the sparsity of natural resources in the 
countries or the difficulties of acquiring them due to established ownership. Usually there 
are also other, more important, motives behind the rare Chinese resource seeking FDI in 
the small developed economies, such as strategic asset seeking. Chinese efficiency 
seeking FDI are also rare but potential in some small developed economies, especially in 
the logistics sector if the countries locate in a pivotal area for transportation. These kinds 
of small developed countries are e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden in the context of North 
Europe. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this study, the small developed economies basically do not have 
the basic location advantages that attract the Chinese most and thus the amount of the 
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Chinese FDI in those economies has not been remarkable (e.g. Kolstad & Wiik 2009). 
However, their advanced factor conditions and demand factors, i.e. high purchasing 
power, open and transparent economies – also towards the competitions from abroad - , 
good governance and advanced legislation, high technological and R&D level, advanced 
consumer markets, educated labour and possible membership in special economic regions, 
such as EU, are seen positive for the Chinese FDI. These results are in line with, for 
instance, UNCTAD report 2006 (156-157) of Chinese FDI in general level. Therefore 
these countries have found to be suitable try-out fields to test and develop products, 
service and management before entering the bigger markets, particularly in Europe where 
larger markets are close to the Nordic countries and small developed countries in Western 
and Central Europe, for instance. Furthermore, the clusters of different industries are a 
very powerful attracting factor for the Chinese MNEs, among others. The findings of this 
study indicate that the strong ICT clusters in Finland and Sweden have been the most 
important single reason for several significant Chinese FDI in the countries. In other 
words, related and supporting industries has found to be the most significant attribute 
from Porter‟s national diamond model (Porter 1990). 
 
The Chinese investors, especially the smaller companies and entrepreneurs, are also 
interested in the high welfare, social security, free or cheap education as well as safe and 
clean environment. To this type of investors an opportunity to obtain residence permits in 
the countries with high living standards, and possibly also in EU, is very attractive. Deng 
(2004) and Antkiewicz & Whalley (2007) had earlier come to the same conclusions. 
Apparently, the number of Chinese residents has a substantial influence on the amount of 
the Chinese inward FDI also in the small developed economies, similarly as at general 
level (Child & Rodrigues 2005). The results of this study from Finland and Sweden 
suggest in this direction as there are much more the Chinese residents as well as FDI in 
Sweden than in Finland. In the other hands, there is not unambiguous evidence that the 
number of the Chinese students is correlated to the amount of the inward Chinese FDI in 
the country. Obviously, it is more important how well the Chinese are employed after 
their graduation so that they would remain to create networks between the country of 
residence and China.  
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In China, many small developed economies are not too well-known so presence and 
focused country promotion are essential factors which directly affect the interest of the 
Chinese to invest, i.e. the host country governments‟ role is crucial in this sense as Porter 
(1990) and Dunning & Lundan (2008) also emphasized. The number of companies and 
their institutions (e.g. chambers of commerce) established in China is an important factor 
as well as how much certain country does invest-in promotion in China. The results of 
this study indicate that these factors influence greatly the development of relations and 
hence the awareness of the Chinese about the investment opportunities in a small and 
lesser-known country. However, merely the trade between the countries itself does not 
appear to increase the amount of the Chinese FDI in the trading partner countries, unlike 
in some studies indicate (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007). Only in the case of the Netherlands 
the trade may be the explanatory factor for the relatively high number of the Chinese FDI 
in the country, likely because of logistical reasons. 
 
Finally, the political relations between countries are not very important for the Chinese 
FDI in the small developed economies, as long as they are at a tolerable level. The reason 
for this largely is that the Chinese has made only a few investments in natural resources 
in these economies. The investments of this kind are almost without exception made by 
the Chinese SOEs and because of that, the political relations are important behind the 
investments. In addition, The Chinese government also plays an important role as a 
financier and guarantor in the major M&A made by the Chinese MNEs. Also the small 
developed economies have experience of this, such as in Sweden in the acquisition of 
Volvo by a Chinese company, and the cases of this kind are likely to increase in the 
future for the growth and internationalization of the Chinese companies. All in all, the 
role of the Chinese government is lighter behind the Chinese FDI in small developed 
economies than it often is in many other destinations (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007 and von 
Zedtwitz 2005). However, by the increasing number of M&A its importance is growing 
at least as a financial guarantor for the Chinese MNEs also in the small developed 
economies. 
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5.3 Limitations of the study 
 
The number of the Chinese investments in Finland is still rather small and it inflicted 
some limitations in gathering information because the pool of the Chinese interviewees 
was moderately small. However, many of the Chinese that were invited for interview 
agreed to participate and there were only a few refusals. The Chinese businessmen tend to 
be quite challenging to interview due to different language and the fact that they are not 
very familiar with the interviews and academic research. That is why in some interviews, 
especially with the older and more experienced Chinese managers in state-owned 
companies, it was demanding to express the question so that the necessary information 
was able to be brought out. Sometimes it was difficult to obtain a reliable perception of 
the underlying investment motives. This sometimes required quite long casual small talk 
in order to create a climate of trust. 
 
The Chinese inward FDI is a very novel phenomenon in Finland, so particularly many 
Finnish investment experts had to speak about the motives of the Chinese largely in 
general terms without concrete examples, or with allusions to the future prospects. By 
contrast, they had relatively clear and quite similar views with the Chinese on the FDI 
location factors in Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish companies that are in cooperation, 
and especially in a customer relation, with the Chinese MNEs were not interviewed 
practice at all, but their information was collected mainly using the secondary sources. 
 
The number of the interviews with the Swedes was small due to lack of resources for the 
study because they should have been done mainly in Sweden.  In Sweden, totally only 
four interviews were made and one of them was with a Chinese person. In addition, the 
author of this study was not present in those interviews. Still, several Chinese 
interviewees in Finland had worked also in Sweden and they could provide valuable 
benchmark information between the countries.  
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5.4 Suggestions for further research 
 
As the Chinese outward FDI are studied mostly only at the general level and the 
phenomenon is still relatively new, it should be studied more thoroughly in different type 
of countries, country groups and environments. This is both interesting and necessary 
because the amount of the Chinese FDI will undoubtedly continue its notable growth and 
China will be one of the largest foreign investors in the future. Therefore, it is good to 
have researched information about the motives behind the Chinese investments and how 
and why different kinds of business environments attract them. The latter knowledge is 
valuable because the Chinese investments will be - and in some host countries in Asia 
and Africa already are - an important and dynamic part of the domestic economy in most 
of the countries. 
 
This study concentrated on two small developed economies, Finland and Sweden, and 
drew conclusions from this basis. However, it would be useful to test the generalizability 
of the results of this study by conducting further studies in the other small developed 
economies in other regions, such as New Zealand, Switzerland, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, as the number of the Chinese FDI in Finland has begun to 
grow not until very recent years this type of study could be done again within next five or 
ten years while the number of new Chinese FDI – and thus also the research population – 
has been undoubtedly increased. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Chinese Foreign Investments in the Baltic Sea region, interview questions: 
 
1. Background information 
- Line of business and company‟s size (turnover and number of employees) 
- Main products and markets 
- Share of foreign markets in the turnover 
- Investments in foreign countries 
- Role and importance of Finland and the Baltic Sea region for the company 
- Has the company invested in several locations / countries in the Baltic Sea region? 
- Value of the investment(s) (in Finland and/or other countries in the region) 
- Other locations that were considered suitable 
- Share of ownership and the owners (if the subsidiary or JV) 
- Way of establishment (greenfield, acquisition, JV) 
- Main operations of the subsidiary (e.g. production, sales & marketing, R&D etc.) 
- How does the investment support company‟s strategic goals and global 
competitiveness? 
 
2. General information about the target country or region 
- What makes Finland / the region attractive for foreign investors? 
- Did it/them impact on the investment decision? 
- Is the location in the Euro-currency area important to the company?  
- What are the major problems or hindrance to investment in Finland / the region? 
- How has the business environment in Finland and Baltic Sea region developed 
and how has it affected company‟s operations in the area? 
- Does investment in Finland service a bigger context, e.g. sales in St. Petersburg 
area or elsewhere in the Baltic Sea region, or supply-distribution chain? 
- What kind of added value the investment generates for the company? Does it also 
benefit the home market, e.g. in creation or transfer of new technologies? 
- Why Sweden and Denmark has managed better in their promotion for Chinese 
FDI than Finland? Why there are more Chinese investments in Sweden/Denmark 
than in Finland? 
 
3. Relationship with the public sector 
- Has the public sector subsidize you with any kind of incentive that impacted on 
the investment decision? 
- Had the functionality / effectiveness of the public sector any impact on the 
investment decision? 
- Have the relationship with the public sector been an important part of the 
investment decision and do they have any impact at the moment? 
- What are the major problems/challenges related to the public sector? 
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- Are they any problem in taxation or legislation, e.g. visa and immigration policy? 
- How the public sector and related organizations could develop Finland and the 
Baltic Sea region more attractive destination for foreign investments? 
 
4. Relationship with the local partner company (if any) 
- Does the company have a local partner company and how did the cooperation 
begin? 
- What were the factors affecting the partner selection? 
- How the cooperation works between the partners (distribution of work and the 
responsibilities)? 
- Distribution of know-how, technology and innovations 
- Role of personal relationships in the cooperation 
- The major problems/challenges in cooperation 
 
5. Relationship with the companies and market 
- Did the company have any operation in the target area before the investment 
(exporting, licensing etc.)? 
- What was the main motive to invest in Finland? 
- What are the major competitive edges of the company and local companies? 
- Had clusters or other company networks any impact on the investment decision? 
- Has a previous partnership or business relationship with a Finnish company or 
with a company from the Baltic Sea region in China or elsewhere in the world led 
or affected the investment in Finland / the Baltic Sea region? 
- Does the company have many supplier or customer in the region? 
- Does the company have cooperation with local companies, and what kind of 
(R&D, technology transfer, co-marketing etc.) 
- Has the investment contributed in gathering of market information and/or 
localization of products/operations? 
- Is the company renowned in the target area and has the investment improved the 
situation? 
 
6. Employees 
- How big personnel the company has in Finland / the Baltic Sea region? 
- How many of personnel are local and how many Chinese? 
- What is the company‟s recruiting policy and is it easy to find skilled employees in 
the area? 
- Is the employees‟ level / know-how one reason for the investment? 
- How the Chinese employees‟ migration has been arranged (e.g. living conditions, 
permissions etc.)? Are those permits easy to be issued? 
- Has there been any problem related work or organization culture? 
 
7. Future 
- How the business operations are expected to develop in the target area in the 
future? Will the number of Chinese investments/companies increase? 
- Is the company planning to make new investments or expand the present 
investment in the future? 
- Is the company planning to recruit more local or Chinese employees? 
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- What kind of cooperation with local public sector and companies do you 
expect/wish in the future? 
- What are the major risks that threaten the region and investments there? 
- What have been the major problems that the Chinese companies have faced in the 
region and have there been done some common mistakes among the companies? 
 
 
Appendix 2  
 
Ten largest investing countries into China by FDI flow in 2008. 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2009. 
 
 
  
Pos. Country Million USD
1 Hong Kong 41 036
2 Virgin Islands 15 954
3 Singapore 4 435
4 Japan 3 652
5 Cayman Islands 3 145
6 South Korea 3 135
7 USA 2 944
8 Samoa 2 550
9 Taiwan 1 899
10 Mauritius 1 494
EU 4 995
Others 7 156
Total 92 395
FDI flow into China in 2008
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Appendix 3 
 
Ten largest export and import countries of China in 2009. 
 
Source: China Custom Statistics 2010. 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Largest inward FDI destination countries globally by flow and stock in 2009. 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2010. 
 
 
Pos. Country Billion USD Pos. Country Billion USD
1 USA 220,8 1 Japan 130,9
2 Hong Kong 166,2 2 South Korea 102,6
3 Japan 97,9 3 Taiwan 85,7
4 South Korea 53,7 4 USA 77,4
5 Germany 49,9 5 Germany 55,8
6 Netherlands 36,7 6 Australia 39,4
7 UK 31,3 7 Malesia 32,3
8 Singapore 30,1 8 Brazil 28,3
9 India 29,7 9 Thailand 24,9
10 France 21,5 10 Russia 21,3
EU 236,3 EU 127,8
Total 1 201,7 Total 1 005,6
Export from China in 2009 Import to China in 2009
Pos. Country Million USD Pos. Country Million USD
1 USA 129 883 1 USA 3 120 583
2 China 95 000 2 France 1 132 961
3 France 59 628 3 UK 1 125 066
4 Hong Kong 48 449 4 Hong Kong 912 166
5 UK 45 676 5 Belgium 830 101
6 Russia 38 722 6 Germany 701 643
7 Germany 35 606 7 Spain 670 550
8 Saudi Arabia 35 514 8 Netherlands 596 669
9 India 34 613 9 Canada 524 938
10 Italy 30 538 10 China 473 083
EU 361 949 EU 7 447 904
Others 370 059 Others 5 264 734
Total 1 114 189 Total 17 743 408
FDI flow in 2009 FDI stock in 2009
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Appendix 5 
 
Value of global FDI in the small developed economies in 2009 (million USD) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2010. 
Country Inflow Stock
Australia 22 572 328 090
Austria 7 051 168 550
Belgium 33 782 830 101
Canada 18 657 524 938
Denmark 7 800 157 627
Finland 2 551 88 441
Greece 3 355 44 927
Hong Kong 48 449 912 166
Ireland 24 971 193 302
Israel 10 877 71 258
The Netherlands 26 949 596 669
New Zealand 348 66 634
Norway 6 657 116 090
Portugal 2 871 111 272
Singapore 16 809 343 599
Sweden 10 851 304 504
Switzerland 9 695 463 799
